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    <title>Statistical Modeling, Causal Inference, and Social Science</title>
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    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2008-11-24:/~cook/movabletype/mlm/1</id>
    <updated>2010-02-09T19:47:36Z</updated>
    
    <generator uri="http://www.sixapart.com/movabletype/">Movable Type Pro 4.31-en</generator>

<entry>
    <title>If I had known it was harmless I would&apos;ve killed it myself</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/if_i_had_known.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3081</id>

    <published>2010-02-09T19:30:11Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-09T19:47:36Z</updated>

    <summary>A coauthor and I just recently submitted a revision of our manuscript to a journal. If we&apos;d known it was going to be so much work, we probably never would&apos;ve written the paper in the first place. . . ....</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Literature" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>A coauthor and I just recently submitted a revision of our manuscript to a journal.  If we'd known it was going to be so much work, we probably never would've written the paper in the first place. . . .  It's a surprising amount of work between idea and execution (even forgetting about issues such as writing the letter in response to the referee reports).  And, actually, this particular review process was very easy, as such things go.  Still a lot of effort, though.  It reminds me that being able to something once is a lot less than describing a method clearly and in appropriate generality.</p>]]>
        
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Get off that goddam cell phone!</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/get_off_that_go.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3045</id>

    <published>2010-02-09T16:03:21Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-09T17:40:35Z</updated>

    <summary>Mark Glaser writes an interesting but confusing article about a journalism class at NYU where students aren&apos;t allowed to blog or twitter about the class content: After New York University journalism student Alana Taylor wrote her first embed report for...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Teaching" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>Mark Glaser writes an interesting but confusing <a href="http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2008/09/nyu-professor-stifles-blogging-twittering-by-journalism-student261.html">article</a> about a journalism class at NYU where students aren't allowed to blog or twitter about the class content:</p>

<blockquote>After New York University journalism student Alana Taylor wrote <a href="http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2008/09/old-thinking-permeates-major-journalism-school249.html">her first embed report for MediaShift</a> on September 5, it didn't take long for her scathing criticism of NYU to spread around the web and stir conversations. . . . By Taylor's account, [journalism professor Mary] Quigley had a one-on-one meeting with Taylor to discuss the article, and Quigley made it clear that Taylor was not to blog, Twitter or write about the class again.</blockquote>

<p>Glaser then corresponds with Prof. Quigley, who emails:</p>

<blockquote>I [Quigley] will confirm that I asked the class not to text, email or make cell phone calls during class. It's distracting to both me and other students, especially in a small class seated around a conference table. This has always been my policy, and I would hazard a guess that it's the policy of many professors no matter the discipline.

<p>However, I did say after the class session they were free to text, Twitter, blog, email, post on Facebook or whatever outlet they wanted about the course, my teaching, the content, etc.</blockquote></p>

<p>Seems clear enough:  Keep your thumbs to yourself during the class period then write it all down later.  Makes sense to me.  But then Glaser reports:</p>

<blockquote>When I [Glaser] followed up and asked her whether that meant students still needed to get permission before writing about class, she said: "Yes, I would certainly require a student to ask permission to use direct quotes from the class on a blog written after class."</blockquote>

<p>Huh?  Didn't she just say "they were free to text, Twitter, blog, email, . . . whatever they wanted about the course"?  At this point, I wish Glaser had gone back to Quigley one more time for a clarification.</p>

<p>P.S.  I looked up Mary Quigley on the web and found <a href="http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/livewire/faculty/prof_mary_quigl/">this</a> list of articles by her students--judging from the quick summaries, apparently Quigley teaches a class on feature writing--and <br />
<a href="http://journalism.nyu.edu/faculty/quigley.html">this</a> homepage, which to me was suprisingly brief, but I suppose that journalists have a tradition of not giving our their work for free.</p>

<p>P.P.S.  Without knowing more details than what is in the links above, I'm 100% in support of Taylor, the student who was told not to blog.  But I can definitely sympathize with Quigley:  I can well imagine a student in one of my classes blogging something like this:</p>

<blockquote>At the halfway point in the class, Quigley lets us go on a break. In the bathroom I run into an old classmate who asks me if I am going to stay in the class. I ask her if she doesn't like it and she responds that she is worried of it being too "all-over the place" or "disorganized" or "confusing."</blockquote>

<p>Ouch!</p>

<p>P.P.P.S.  I was amused that Taylor wrote that "I like to think that having a blog is as normal as having a car."  Where exactly does she park?</p>]]>
        
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>When the log scale meets the linear scale</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/when_the_log_sc.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3062</id>

    <published>2010-02-08T19:54:21Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-09T07:31:15Z</updated>

    <summary>After writing this, I scrolled down Ben Casnocha&apos;s blog and read a few more entries and came to this discussion of Nassim Taleb. Casnocha writes: At the bottom of Taleb&apos;s homepage he posts his email address and invites readers to...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Decision Theory" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Economics" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>After writing this, I scrolled down Ben Casnocha's blog and read a few more entries and came to <a href="http://ben.casnocha.com/2010/01/why-nassim-taleb-walks-1.html">this</a> discussion of Nassim Taleb.  Casnocha writes:</p>

<blockquote>At the bottom of <a href="http://fooledbyrandomness.com/">Taleb's homepage</a> he posts his email address and invites readers to contact him. With some qualifications:

<blockquote>Concise messages are much preferable (say a maximum < 40 words) as I will not be able to read long letters. Please do not 1) send me your papers or other "interesting material" to read, 2) ask finance questions (not my specialty, 3) make me to rewrite sections of my books (I write books, not emails), 4) ask for a list of "other interesting books to read", 5) ask me to provide career or educational advice, 6) send me passages from Tolstoy or the Ecclesiast on luck and randomness, 7) send me the list of typos in my drafts. Note that I almost always reply (but ONLY to short messages), time permitting (but once) -even to nasty emails. Finally, note that, thanks to my new keyboard, I sometimes reply in Arabic, particularly to academics. [Also please please refrain from offering to "improve" my web site].</blockquote>

<p>He opens his piece on walking by noting that thanks to the "exposure" of his books he came onto theories about fitness by two authors. I imagine this happend by a reader writing in and sharing "interesting material" of the sort he says he does not want. I have never emailed Taleb, but I [Casnocha] don't take his qualifications seriously. It is, in fact, a very naked way to signal busyness and importance.</blockquote></p>

<p>I think there's something important that Casnocha (and his blog commenter) are not understanding here, and that is the interaction between the linear scaling of a person's time and the exponential scaling of fame.</p>

<p>Here's the deal.  Taleb is one person.  I'm sure he can answer emails faster than most of us--and he might even have a secretary to filter out the spam--but, still, he's responding to these on human scale.  Similarly, he writes just like the rest of us (James Patterson and Doris Kearns Goodwin excepted), putting one word after the other.  Even if he writes 10 times faster than a less practiced writer, he still has to do the work.</p>

<p>But . . . he's really famous.  OK, not famous like Elvis or even Bob Dylan, but he could very well be receiving a zillion emails per day.  Taleb doesn't <em>need</em> to signal busyness and important.  He's certainly important, and if he tries to answer all his emails, he's gonna be busy also.  Lots of famous people don't have emails at all</p>

<p>I do, however, think it's a bit silly for Taleb to ask people not to send him things to read.  I like when people send me things to read.  I can look at a couple paragraphs and decide if I want to read more.  Sometimes people send interesting things.  Also, I'd recommend that Taleb get rid of his "almost always reply" rule.  I almost always reply to emails, but Taleb must receive many many more than I do.</p>

<p>P.S.  <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2008/09/heinleins_fan_m.html">Heinlein's solution</a>.</p>]]>
        
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Krzysztof Burdzy replies to the reviews of Christian Robert and myself</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/krzysztof_burdz.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3080</id>

    <published>2010-02-08T18:22:12Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-08T18:39:23Z</updated>

    <summary>Last week, Christian Robert and I separately reviewed Krzysztof Burdzy&apos;s book, The Search for Certainty, which I characterized as a harmless if misleading discussion of the philosophy of probability. Burdzy sent us his reply, which I will post below, followed...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Bayesian Statistics" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>Last week, Christian Robert and I separately reviewed Krzysztof Burdzy's book, The Search for Certainty, which I <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/01/standard_textbo.html">characterized</a> as a harmless if misleading discussion of the philosophy of probability.  Burdzy sent us his reply, which I will post below, followed by my comments.  I am omitting some parts of Burdzy's comments that are specifc to Christian's review and not of general interest.</p>]]>
        <![CDATA[<blockquote>Dear Professors Gelman and Robert,

<p>First of all, thank you for reading my book. I will refer to [your] reviews as [CR] and [AG]. I will refer to my book as [KB].  Since I referred to the foundations of probability as "one of the greatest intellectual failures of the twentieth century", I should not have expected an enthusiastic reaction from the community or probabilists, statisticians and philosophers. Hence, your criticism is not a great surprise for me. In this reply, I will try to avoid opinions, as much as it is possible in this area--we obviously have different opinions and we all expressed them in public. I will try focus on facts, because this may help the readers of your reviews and the readers of my book.</p>

<p>FACTS</p>

<p>1. I witnessed the following event. Wilfrid Kendall was asked a question at the end of a talk at a conference. He said "My answer will be very aggressive. I totally agree with you." (He followed with more substantial remarks). My reaction to your reviews will be very aggressive|I totally agree with you. Well, to be honest, I totally agree on one point: "[the book does not make] a significant contribution to the foundations of statistical inference in general and of Bayesian analysis in particular." ([CR] p. 7). On page vii of [KB], I clearly state my three intellectual goals: (i) Criticism of von Mises and de Finetti, (ii) Presentation of my "scientific theory or probability", and (iii) Education of scientists about philosophical theories of probability. The subtitle of [KB] (at least implicitly) indicates that the book is about the miscommunication between philosophers and scientists. On p. 199 of [KB] I say that it is not my ambition to reform statistics. I would have never stated my intellectual goals as a desire to make "a significant contribution to the foundations of statistical inference in general and of Bayesian analysis in particular."</p>

<p>. . .</p>

<p>5. On p. 6 of [CR], the following quote from [KB] is given: "subjective theory does not provide any justification for the use of the Bayes theorem". A very similar quote appears in the second to last paragraph of [AG]. I find it amusing that [CR] calls my claim "rather nonsensical" while [AG] says "fine by me, but of course nothing new." I can't win--if my claim is true, I failed to notice that it was well known; if it is false, I failed to notice that it was nonsensical.</p>

<p>. . .</p>

<p>OPINION</p>

<p>8. On p. 3 of [CR] there is a remark on the "lack of involved examples". I do not see how involved examples could have changed the perception of my book. I do not have any new frequency or Bayesian statistical methods to propose. I believe that all statisticians, probabilists and other scientists should use (L1)-(L5) to teach the basic principles of probability. Would involved examples make (L1)-(L5) more attractive to you?</p>

<p>9. On p. 6 of [CR] I am criticized for concentrating \on two very specific entries to frequentism and subjectivism, namely von Mises' and de Finetti's, respectively, while those are not your average statistician's references." I explain on p. 12 of [KB] why I chose the theories of von Mises and de Finetti. Let me repeat and rephrase my reasons. These two theories are more or less complete and more or less logically consistent philosophical theories created by people who are recognized by philosophers as the leading figures in frequency and subjective currents of philosophy of probability. De Finetti and von Mises wrote books that I could study and criticize. There is an implicit suggestion in [CR] that I have chosen the wrong theories to criticize and that statisticians apparently use other philosophical theories. As far as I can tell, statisticians have a multitude of philosophical opinions but that does not mean that these opinions add up to a logically consistent theory. If I ever want to criticize the Catholic theology, I will use the official Vatican doctrine as the target of my criticism. It is unquestionably true that the real religious beliefs of Catholics are quite often different from the Vatican doctrine, but the union of all beliefs of all Catholics does not add up to a logically consistent philosophy (as far as I can tell).</p>

<p>. . .</blockquote></p>

<p>My comments:  I stand by my opinion that, from this statistician's perspective, Burdzy's book is unremarkable except in its insistence on its remarkability.  I also continue to disagree with his statement that "standard textbooks on chemistry do not discuss subjectivity in their introductions, and so statistical textbooks need not to do that either"; yes, chemistry and statistics overlap--I've done some work on toxicology, myself--but overall I think the two fields can think about their textbooks independently.  Regarding Burdzy's point 9 above, he can feel free to criticize von Mises, de Finetti, or even Pope Benedict.  None of this has any impact on my work but it could be of interest to others.<br />
Finally, regarding point 5 above, let me emphasize that Christian Robert and I are two different people.  in any case, I hope this discussion is helpful to somebody somewhere!</p>]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Blog style</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/blog_style.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3061</id>

    <published>2010-02-07T19:21:33Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-07T15:43:22Z</updated>

    <summary>I followed this link from Tyler Cowen to &quot;Ben Casnocha on Chile&quot; and found . . . a long blog entry that was exactly in the style of Tyler Cowen! I wonder if Cowen realized this when he linked to...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Literature" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>I followed <a href="http://www.marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2010/01/assorted-links-27.html">this link</a> from Tyler Cowen to "<a href="http://ben.casnocha.com/2010/01/a-smattering-of-impressions-from-chile.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+ItsLikeBensBlog+%28Ben+Casnocha%27s+Blog%29">Ben Casnocha on Chile</a>" and found . . . a long blog entry that was exactly in the style of Tyler Cowen!  I wonder if Cowen realized this when he linked to it.  Probably not:  just as we don't notice our own strong smells (or so I've been told), it's probably also hard for anyone to notice an imitation of one's own style.  I do wonder whether Casnocha was imitating Cowen on purpose--not such a bad idea when blogging to imitate a master, just as short-story writers continue to <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2009/01/one_more_john_u.html">imitate John Updike</a>.  Personally, I'm sick and tired of book and movie reviewers imitating Pauline Kael--I didn't even like her own writing and I don't enjoy seeing her stylistic ticks repeated by others--but, hey, that's their choice.</p>

<p>P.S.  In case you're wondering, here are a few Cowenisms in Casnocha's blog:</p>]]>
        <![CDATA[<blockquote>Abortion is still illegal here and divorce was too until only recently. . . . The elite are Catholic, but "the masses" are not as much. I have not yet met a Chilean under 30 years old who fervently believes in religion. Most go to church to appease their parents.

<p>Pinochet's legacy in Chile is complicated and it is hard to find sources who can assess his pros and cons objectively.</p>

<p>Santiago is just as beautiful as B.A. and of course it is much safer and less corrupt. Colombians and Mexicans I know call Santiago "boring." It is less chaotic than Mexico City and more predictable than Bogota but it is not boring.</p>

<p>Buenos Aires is the hipper Southern Cone capital city; Patagonia is not seen as uniquely Chilean, and it's not; the Atacama desert and Easter Island are low-profile; and other than wine there are no famous Chilean exports. (Yes there's salmon and copper and others but people don't know about them.)</blockquote></p>

<p>It's not that Cowen would've written all of these things, or even any of them--one thing Casnocha doesn't seem to have is Cowen's gift for pithiness--but I think they're basically in his style.</p>

<p>P.S.  Style is a subset of content, but the converse holds also:  content is a subset of style.</p>]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>What if senators represented people by income or race, not by state?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/what_if_senator.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3079</id>

    <published>2010-02-07T07:10:07Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-07T19:54:34Z</updated>

    <summary>Annie Lowrey speculates: Based on Census Bureau data, five senators would represent Americans earning between $100,000 and $1 million individually per year, with [2/10 of a senator] working on behalf of the millionaires. Eight senators would represent Americans with no...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Political Science" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>Annie Lowrey <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/05/AR2010020501446.html">speculates</a>:</p>

<blockquote>Based on Census Bureau data, five senators would represent Americans earning between $100,000 and $1 million individually per year, with [2/10 of a senator] working on behalf of the millionaires. Eight senators would represent Americans with no income. Sixteen would represent Americans who make less than $10,000 a year, an amount well below the federal poverty line for families. The bulk of the senators would work on behalf of the middle class, with 34 representing Americans making $30,000 to $80,000 per year. . . . Or how about if senators represented particular demographic groups, based on gender and race? White women would elect the biggest group of senators -- 37 of them, though only 38 women have ever served in the Senate.</blockquote>

<p>I don't know how well all of this would work in practice--for one thing, I wouldn't want the senator who represents two-year-olds to be anywhere near the nuclear button--but I agree that ideas of fairness and political representation are <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/chance.pdf">subtle</a>.</p>

<p>Along similar lines, <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2005/09/why-are-there-s.html">here</a> is my response to economists who complained that there were not enough economists in elective office: </p>]]>
        <![CDATA[<blockquote>I was curious about this so I looked up some statistics--not on Congress but on the workforce. According to the 2001 Statistical Abstract of the United States, there were 139,000 economists employed in the United States, which represented 0.1% of the employed population. 1% of 535 is about 1/2, so with at least two economists in Congress, the profession is hardly unrepresented.

<p>139,000 is a crude estimate because it presumably represents the people whose job title is "economist" (and thus wouldn't include, for example, Matt Kahn, who originally raised the "not enough economists in Congress" issue and whose job title is "professor"). But, even throwing in all these economics professors and various other practicing economists, I still don't think it would add up to the half-million that would be necessary to reach 2/535 of the employed population.</p>

<p>This is not to debate the merits of the argument--perhaps Congress would indeed be better if it included more economists--but rather to note that people with this sort of job are a small minority in the U.S. (In contrast, there were 720,000 physicians, 170,000 dentists, and 2.1 million nurses, and 1.7 million health technicians in the U.S.)</p>

<p>To put it another way, without reference to economists (or to the 2.1 million "mathematical and computer scientists" out there): the Statistical Abstract has 260,000 psychologists. Certainly Congress would be better off with a few psychologists, who might understand how citizens might be expected to react to various policies.</p>

<p>I'm willing to believe that the country's 890,000 lawyers are being overrepresented, but what about the 114,000 biologists? A few of these in Congress might advance the understanding of public health. And then there are the 290,000 civil engineers--I'd like to have a few of them around also. I'd also like some of the 280,000 child care workers and 620,000 pre-K and kindergarten teachers to give their insight on deliberations on family policy. And the 1.1 million police officers and 340,000 prison guards will have their own perspectives on justice issues.</p>

<p>So I think that representation is a tricky issue. Most of us would probably like more "people like us" in Congress, but that's tough with only 535 seats to go around, and given that there are a lot of politicians already out there (many of whom are lawyers) who you'd be competing with.</blockquote></p>

<p><span style="font-weight:bold;">Does it make a difference?</span>  Maybe so.  In his article, "Does the Numerical Over-Representation of the Upper Class in U.S. Legislatures Matter?", Nicholas Carnes <a href="http://www.princeton.edu/~carnes/research.html">finds</a>:</p>

<blockquote>Throughout America's history, most political decisionmakers have been highly-educated, wealthy individuals from prestigious, high-paying occupations. . . . On balance, this study's findings suggest that the numerical over-representation of affluent Americans in elected offices promotes more conservative economic policy outcomes, although not for the straightforward reasons that political observers have often suggested.</blockquote> 

<p>P.S.  One suggestion that's come up from time to <a href="http://michaelkenny.blogspot.com/2009/10/randomocracy.html">time</a> is to form the Senate from a national random sample of adults.  This would give you all the representativeness you'd want.</p>

<p>P.P.S.  Apparently the House has four (former) blue-collar workers:  Phil Hare of Illinois, Stephen Lynch of Massachusetts, Mike Michaud of Maine, and Bob Brady of Pennsylvania.  I don't know how many former nurses, police officers, or child care workers they have.</p>

<p>P.P.P.S.  Some data <a href="http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/02/what-if-senators-represented-people-by.html#comment-8891026896426012878">here</a>.</p>]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Ma conférence à Ensae</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/ma_conference_a.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3077</id>

    <published>2010-02-06T14:57:14Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-06T15:08:06Z</updated>

    <summary>Ici....</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Political Science" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/presentations/redblue_stat.pdf">Ici</a>.</p>]]>
        
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>A matter of perspective?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/a_matter_of_per.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3075</id>

    <published>2010-02-05T19:32:37Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-05T19:55:03Z</updated>

    <summary>An article in The Guardian says; David Champion, director of automobile testing for Consumer Reports magazine, said the core problem of faulty Toyota accelerators had been linked to 19 deaths in a decade, amounting to two a year of the...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Phil</name>
        
    </author>
    
    <category term="toyota" label="Toyota" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>An article in <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/feb/05/toyota-united-states-reaction">The Guardian</a> says;<br />
<blockquote><br />
David Champion, director of automobile testing for Consumer Reports magazine, said the core problem of faulty Toyota accelerators had been linked to 19 deaths in a decade, amounting to two a year of the 40,000 people killed annually on American roads.</p>

<p>"I find it a little odd that we're going to have a Congressional hearing to look at those two deaths out of 40,000," said Champion.</blockquote></p>]]>
        
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Helping people fill out financial aid forms (at H&amp;R Block!) increases the rate of college attendance</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/helping_people.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3076</id>

    <published>2010-02-05T19:24:06Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-05T21:37:30Z</updated>

    <summary>Eric Bettinger, Bridget Terry Long, Philip Oreopoulos, and Lisa Sanbonmatsu write: Growing concerns about low awareness and take-up rates for government support programs like college financial aid have spurred calls to simplify the application process and enhance visibility. Here&apos;s the...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Causal Inference" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Economics" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
        <category term="Statistical graphics" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>Eric Bettinger, Bridget Terry Long, Philip Oreopoulos, and Lisa Sanbonmatsu <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w15361">write</a>:</p>

<blockquote>Growing concerns about low awareness and take-up rates for government support programs like college financial aid have spurred calls to simplify the application process and enhance visibility.</blockquote>

<p>Here's the study:</p>

<blockquote>H&R Block tax professionals helped low- to moderate-income families complete the FAFSA, the federal application for financial aid. Families were then given an estimate of their eligibility for government aid as well as information about local postsecondary options. A second randomly-chosen group of individuals received only personalized aid eligibility information but did not receive help completing the FAFSA.</blockquote>

<p>And the results:</p>

<blockquote>Comparing the outcomes of participants in the treatment groups to a control group . . . individuals who received assistance with the FAFSA and information about aid were substantially more likely to submit the aid application, enroll in college the following fall, and receive more financial aid. . . . However, only providing aid eligibility information without also giving assistance with the form had no significant effect on FAFSA submission rates.</blockquote>

<p>The treatment raised the proportion of applicants in this group who attended college from 27% (or, as they quaintly put it, "26.8%") to 35%.  Pretty impressive.  Overall, it appears to be a clean study.  And they estimate interactions (that is, varying treatment effects), which is always, always, always a good idea.</p>

<p>Here are my recommendations for improving the article (and this, I hope, increasing the influence of this study):</p>]]>
        <![CDATA[<p>1.  Show some data.  I want to see scatterplots with the outcome on the y-axis, pre-treatment variables on the x-axis, and individuals shown by points (treated units as circles, controls as dots).  I wanna see what's going on here.  The data are discrete, so maybe plot some binned averages.  For an x-axis you can use the combined linear predictor, the X*beta for all the pre-treatment X's put together, with beta as fitted from the regression model.</p>

<p>The only graphs in the actual article are graphs of the estimated model.  That's fine if you fully believe the model, but I'd be more convinced with some data.</p>

<p>2.  Display the key causal inferences graphically.  Nothing cute needed here, I'm just thinking of a coefplot such as on page 419 of <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/overdisp_final.pdf">this article</a> (although slightly different, because I'm suggesting they plot all their different estimated treatment effects from their different models, I'm not saying they should plot all their regression coefficients from a single model).  They have multiple outcomes so they could do a multicolumn display:  one column for each outcome and one row for each group where treatment effects are being estimated.</p>

<p>3.  Get rid of all the tables and <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/dodhia.pdf">replace with graphs</a>.  Just for example, do readers really need to know that the rate was ".374" for some group in Table 1?  Yeah, yeah, I know this won't be done.  Still, it's the right thing to do.</p>

<p>Anyway, suggestions 1 and 2 would be a great start, I think.  The first step to build confidence in the results and the second step to summarize their findings.  I read over the paper and it was difficult for me to pick out all the different numbers.  If they'd made a graphical display of their results, I'd've displayed it above, the graph would've grabbed everyone's attention, and right now everybody would be talking about this study.  Also maybe we'd have a better understanding of what they've found in this fascinating experiment.</p>

<p>4.  Post the article on the web.  As it was, it was not easy for me to get it, and I don't know if I'm allowed to post it here.</p>]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Update on the coffee experiment</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/update_on_the_c_1.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3074</id>

    <published>2010-02-05T19:12:36Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-05T19:17:50Z</updated>

    <summary>It&apos;s working, so far....</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Causal Inference" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/01/a_self-experime.html">It's</a> working, <a href="http://www.nomeatathlete.com/quitting-coffee-attracts-some-attention/">so far</a>.</p>]]>
        <![CDATA[<p>Perhaps this fits into the "lots of things will work if you're motivated" category.  When I was a kid, that was my theory about hiccup cures.  There were so many different hiccup cures (holding your breath, drinking a glass of water slowly, getting startled, . . .) and they all seemed to work, so I decided that just about anything would work to cure the hiccups, if you wanted it to work and you had a plausible enough theory attached to it.</p>

<p>This is not to disparage Matt's plan.  It seems to be working for him, which is what's important!</p>]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Explorations in Statistics Research: An Undergraduate Summer Program</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/explorations_in.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3073</id>

    <published>2010-02-05T18:21:29Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-05T18:24:11Z</updated>

    <summary>This program introduces students to three modern, applied statistics research problems, and gives them a sense of how statisticians approach large, complex problems, with the aim of encouraging them to pursue advanced degrees in statistics. The program takes place at...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Miscellaneous Statistics" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>This <a href="http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~summer/">program</a> introduces students to three modern, applied statistics research problems, and gives them a sense of how statisticians approach large, complex problems, with the aim of encouraging them to pursue advanced degrees in statistics.</p>

<p>The program takes place at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, Colorado.  According to the website, the summer 2011 program will be at Columbia.</p>]]>
        
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>&quot;Why do people vote against their own interests?&quot;:  An update</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/why_do_people_v.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3072</id>

    <published>2010-02-05T16:02:59Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-05T18:26:35Z</updated>

    <summary>I emailed David Runciman my discussion of his BBC broadcast (in which he wrote: &quot;It is striking that the people who most dislike the whole idea of healthcare reform - the ones who think it is socialist, godless, a step...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Political Science" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>I emailed David Runciman my <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/why_do_people_w.html">discussion</a> of his BBC broadcast (in which he wrote: "It is striking that the people who most dislike the whole idea of healthcare reform - the ones who think it is socialist, godless, a step on the road to a police state - are often the ones it seems designed to help" and "many of America's poorest citizens have a deep emotional attachment to a party that serves the interests of its richest").</p>

<p>Runciman responded with some comments which made me feel that I was being unfair in my original description of his statements as "the usual errors."</p>

<p>Below is my dialogue with Runciman and also my response to a related comment by Megan Pledger.</p>

<p>Runciman replied to my original blog, reasonably enough, as follows:</p>

<blockquote>I [Runciman] don't think I say at any point (either in the radio program, or the article which is a shortened version of the script) that there is more opposition among the poor than among the rich, or among the young than among the old. I don't say that more people vote against their own interests than vote in their own interests - obviously not true. Maybe it reads like that's implied. But many also implies more than you would expect and I still believe that's true.</blockquote>

<p>To which I replied:</p>]]>
        <![CDATA[<blockquote>My quick understanding of most public opinion trends is of a national shift on top of a spread of relative opinion.  That's why I'm guessing (though I don't know for sure) that health care reform remains most popular among lower-income people under 65, who happen to be the ones who benefit the most from it.  I agree that the shift in national opinion is striking but I suspect it is a shift at all levels.

<p>Regarding the "more than you would expect" issue, I very much agree with you.  My point was that "more than you would expect" is not a new phenomenon in this case:  many (even if not a majority of) low-income people vote for conservative parties, and that has been happening since the dawn of polling in the U.S. and in other countries as well.</blockquote></p>

<p>To which Runciman wrote:</p>

<blockquote>Sure - but I think (I hope) what we were doing in the radio show was talking about the level of anger, which is new, or at least more visible, plus the fact that knowing what makes people angry (being talked down to) doesn't seem to help politicians know how to address it. Isn't this part of Obama's problem? Trying to explain to people what's in their interests seems to be poison in the current political environment, and I don't believe that was always so. But yes people voting against their interests is nothing new.</blockquote>

<p>I'm not sure (one way or another) about the difficulty of explaining to people what's in their interests, but he does have a point about the level of anger, which is something that I don't usually think about when analyzing public opinion.</p>

<p>In the comments to my blog, Megan Pledger makes a similar point:</p>

<blockquote>I [Pledger] think you and Runciman are talking about different "mosts".  You are talking about groups of people with the highest proportion of people against health reforms.  Runciman is talking about people with the higest degree of opposition to the health reforms.  He goes on to try and prove his case using proportions of people. But it's a big call to think degree of opposition amongst people who oppose is distributed the same between demographic groups.</blockquote>

<p>My quick reply is that I think of opposition and anger as different points on a continuum.  Or, to put it another way, visible anger is opposition that has been organized by some political entrepreneur.  I'd guess that the people most angry about health-care reform are similar, demographically, to those who are in opposition to the idea.</p>

<p>I also want to return to the question of changes since 2004.  One thing we noticed from our maps of public opinion in that year is the systematic differences between opinions on health care and partisanship and vote preference.  In the past year, with Obama's push on health care, I expect that opinion on this issue has become more closely correlated with partisanship and ideology, and so I'm guessing it is Republicans and conservatives who have most strongly moved toward opposing the plan.</p>

<p>Runciman had a follow-up BBC broadcast that drew analogies to the politics of the 1930s (a connection I've considered <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/01/its_not_1933_it.html">too</a>), both in the U.S. and the U.K., and the controversies then and now about deficit spending.</p>]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>A propensity for bias?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/a_propensity_fo.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3071</id>

    <published>2010-02-04T16:38:54Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-04T18:51:09Z</updated>

    <summary>Teryn Mattox writes:...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Causal Inference" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>Teryn Mattox writes:</p>]]>
        <![CDATA[<blockquote>I was reminded by your recent post on propensity score matching of a nagging doubt I have about this methodology.  It seems as though propensity score matching actually exacerbates selection bias.  I do research on childhood interventions, and am considering using a matched design to compare the outcomes of children that did and did not receive the "treatment" of high quality preschool.    But...if there are two families that are very similar in every observable way, but the parents still elected to put their kids in different preschool programs, doesn't that mean that there must be that much more difference in unobservable characteristics between the two of them?  For example, we have very few highly educated families putting their kids in bad quality care - those few families must be doing something very different, no?  So won't we dramatically overestimate the treatment effect, even more than if we just did a simple OLS regression?</blockquote>

<p>My response:  First off, this isn't anything specific to propensity scores, or even to matching; it also arises in regression or in any other situation where you're controlling for pre-treatment variables.  I'll give two quick answers.  First, it is generally recommended that you control for as many pretreatment variables as you can.  In their classic article on matching for causal inference, Dehejia and Wahba emphasize the importance of controlling for enough variables (and they discuss what "enough" can mean in practice).  Second, the hope when controlling for things (whether by regression modeling, matching, or other methods) is to reduce the selection bias that you're referring to.  I imagine there've been quite a few papers in statistics and econometrics discussing the conditions under which controlling for a pre-treatment variable reduces bias in estimated treatment effects.</p>]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Why do people write news stories against their own interests?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/why_do_people_w.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3070</id>

    <published>2010-02-04T13:13:49Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-05T16:53:45Z</updated>

    <summary>Matt Stephenson points me to this BBC article, &quot;Why do people vote against their own interests?&quot;, that seems to me to be a bit misleading. This would seem to fall into the dog-bites-man category of &quot;This is important. Someone is...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Political Science" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>Matt Stephenson points me to this BBC <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8474611.stm">article</a>, "Why do people vote against their own interests?", that seems to me to be a bit misleading.  This would seem to fall into the dog-bites-man category of "This is important.  Someone is <em>wrong</em> on the internet"--but it <em>is</em> the fabled BBC, and it <em>is</em> written by a political scientist at fabled Cambridge University--so maybe it's going through some problems.</p>

<blockquote>It is striking [says David Runciman, speaking on the BBC] that the people who most dislike the whole idea of healthcare reform - the ones who think it is socialist, godless, a step on the road to a police state - are often the ones it seems designed to help.</blockquote>

<p>B-b-b-but . . . what about <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2009/11/senators_and_he.html">this</a>?</p>

<p><img alt="mapsnyt.jpg" src="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/mapsnyt.jpg" width="650" height="474" class="mt-image-center" style="text-align: center; display: block; margin: 0 auto 20px;" /></p>

<p>The people who dislike healthcare are primarily those over 65 (who already have free medical care in America) and people with above-average income.  No, these are <em>not</em> really the ones the new bill is most designed to help.</p>

<p>To be fair, though, my maps are based on survey data from 2004.  I haven't been able to grab more recent individual-level data to replicate our analysis with current public opinion.  Still, my guess is that it is the older and richer who most strongly oppose changing the health-care system.</p>

<p>Next:</p>

<blockquote>If people vote against their own interests, it is not because they do not understand what is in their interest or have not yet had it properly explained to them.  They do it because they resent having their interests decided for them by politicians who think they know best.  There is nothing voters hate more than having things explained to them as though they were idiots.</blockquote> 

<p>Hey, I didn't know that!  Maybe it's true.  I thought that in a relatively peaceful and prosperous country such as the United States, there's nothing voters hate more than an economic downturn.</p>

<p>Beyond this, there's little evidence that people vote based on their individual interest or even that they <em>should</em> vote based on their interest; rather, survey data and theory both suggest that people vote based on what they think is best for the country.  (See <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/charity.pdf">here</a> and <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/rational_final6.pdf">here</a>.)  This is not to say that the psychological models of Drew Westen, which are touched upon in this article, are wrong or irrelevant, but merely to point out that "people voting against their interests" is not such a surprise or paradox.</p>

<p>And then there's this:</p>]]>
        <![CDATA[<blockquote>Right-wing politics has become a vehicle for channelling this popular anger against intellectual snobs. The result is that many of America's poorest citizens have a deep emotional attachment to a party that serves the interests of its richest.</blockquote>

<p>Huh?  From <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2009/02/rich_and_poor_s.html">the 2008 election</a>:</p>

<p><span class="mt-enclosure mt-enclosure-image" style="display: inline;"><img alt="pewincome2.png" src="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/pewincome2.png" width="400" height="300" class="mt-image-center" style="text-align: center; display: block; margin: 0 auto 20px;" /></span></p>

<p>Republicans did better among upper-income voters--except possibly for the over-200,000's. (The highest income category from the Pew surveys is "$150,000+", so we can't do a direct comparison at the top.)</p>

<p>Damn!  Another beautiful theory crushed by <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2009/05/discussion_and.html">the facts</a>.</p>

<p>The counterargument, I suppose, is that the curve should be steeper--that the lowest-income voters should be voting even <em>more</em> for the Democrats, but, y'know, some low-income voters have conservative views on economic issues.  More to the point, perhaps, upper-income Americans vote 10-20% more Republican than lower-income Americans, and this difference has been <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/rb_qjps.pdf">pretty stable</a> since 1940 (with a brief interlude during the moderate presidencies of Eisenhower and Kennedy):</p>

<p><img alt="difftrends.png" src="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/difftrends.png" width="563" height="237" class="mt-image-center" style="text-align: center; display: block; margin: 0 auto 20px;" /></p>

<p>Also, as John Huber and Piero Stanig have <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2007/02/why_do_the_poor.html">discussed</a>, rich and poor vote <em>more</em> differently in the United States than in most European countries.  So, either on an absolute or a relative level, I don't see how the argument in this BBC article stands up.</p>

<p><strong>How did this happen?</strong></p>

<p>As an American, I have what is I'm sure a naive view of the BBC as the ultimate in quality broadcasting, so I'm more disturbed by the above-linked article than I would be by a comparable think-piece on a U.S. media outlet.</p>

<p>There's still something that's buggin me here, though, beyond the whole BBC thing.</p>

<p>I can see how a reporter could get confused about this whole rich-voter, poor voter thing--in fact, we devoted chapter 3 of <a href="http://redbluerichpoor.com/">Red State, Blue State</a> to an exploration of how this could happen.  And I could see how the author of this article, David Runciman, could have a view of U.S. politics that differs from mine.  After all, What's the Matter with Kansas (which in its British edition was called What's the Matter with America, to really drive the point home) has probably outsold Red State, Blue State by a factor of 200 or so.</p>

<p>B-b-b-but . . . David Runciman is not just some TV talking head.  He teaches political science at Cambridge University!  I'm sure he's too busy to read up on the American Politics literature, but doesn't he have some colleagues down the hall whom he could talk with about this stuff?</p>

<p>P.S.  We last encountered Runciman when he <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2008/06/but_viewed_in_r.html">described</a> a primary election campaign with the unforgettable phrase, <strong>"But viewed in retrospect, it is clear that it has been quite predictable."</strong>  He also described a survey of 283 people as "throwing darts at a board."  Which of course made me wonder (along the lines of "Why don't the just sell hotcakes?") why they don't just throw darts at a board, then? This would save them lots of money!</p>

<p>P.P.S.  Just to be clear, I'm not saying that Runciman is a bad guy.  My guess is that he just didn't know any better.  He read Thomas Frank's book and it seemed convincing, he doesn't keep up with scholarly debates on U.S. political science, so he didn't know where to look.  As Mark Twain said, it ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.</p>

<p>P.P.P.S.  No, I don't think that Thomas Franks' work is empty of content.  Yes, I do think that the differences between right-wing and left-wing populism are worthy of study.  Yes, I do think it's a good idea to try to understand what happened so that health care reform, which was formerly supported by a solid majority of Americans, is no longer so popular.  But I don't think this discussion is well served by sloppy statements that are contradicted by the data.  As I wrote immediately above, I'm sure Runciman and the BBC would be more accurate, if only they knew that more accurate knowledge was out there.  That's one reason we wrote Red State, Blue State:  in addition to presenting new research and (our idea of) a synthesis, we wanted to communicate to journalists and even English political theorists that U.S. politics isn't quite as they might suppose.</p>

<p>P.P.P.P.S.  I apologize for using the expression "B-b-b-but" twice in one blog entry.  Usually I try to space out my sputterings a bit more, but it just seemed appropriate here.  When ya gotta sputter, ya gotta sputter.</p>

<p>P.P.P.P.P.S.  <a href="https://onbaseweb.cuit.columbia.edu/AppNet/Login.aspx">See here</a> for further discussion (including a response from Runciman).  I think I was being a bit too critical in my blog entry above.  My graphs are good, though, and are relevant to the items being discussed, so I think I'm still usefully adding to the discussion.</p>]]>
    </content>
</entry>

<entry>
    <title>Oscar Wilde, George Orwell, Clark Kent, and posterior predictive checks</title>
    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2010/02/oscar_wilde_geo.html" />
    <id>tag:www.stat.columbia.edu,2010:/~cook/movabletype/mlm//1.3065</id>

    <published>2010-02-03T17:39:06Z</published>
    <updated>2010-02-03T17:02:06Z</updated>

    <summary>It was Oscar Wilde, was it not, who said he would sooner believe a falsehood told well than a truth told falsely? And George Orwell who wrote that good prose is like a windowpane, but sometimes it needs a bit...</summary>
    <author>
        <name>Andrew Gelman</name>
        <uri>http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman</uri>
    </author>
    
        <category term="Bayesian Statistics" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#category" />
    
    
    <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/mlm/">
        <![CDATA[<p>It was Oscar Wilde, was it not, who said he would sooner believe a falsehood told well than a truth told falsely?  And George Orwell who wrote that good prose is like a windowpane, but sometimes it needs a bit of Windex and a clean rag to fully do its job.</p>

<p>Along those lines, Don Rubin has long ago convinced me of the importance of clean statistical notation.  One example that's been important to me is model checking--residual plots, p-values, and all the rest.  The key, to me, is the <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/p755.pdf">Tukeyesque idea</a> of comparing observed data to what could've occurred if the model were true.  The usual way this used to be done in statistics books was to talk about data y and a random variable Y.  If the test statistic is T(y), then the p-value is Pr (T(Y)>T(y)) or, more generally, Pr (T(Y)>T(y) | theta).  (I'm assuming continuous models here so as to avoid having to use the "greater than or equal" symbol.)</p>

<p>But this notation starts to break down once you start thinking about uncertainty in theta.  If theta can be well estimated from data, then maybe you're ok with Pr (T(Y)>T(y) | theta.hat).  But once we go beyond point estimation, we're in trouble, and the trouble is that y is said to be a "realization" of Y.  Just as Clark Kent is a particular realization of Superman.</p>]]>
        <![CDATA[<p>Can we talk about a posterior probability, Pr (T(Y)>T(y) | y)?  Not really, because y and Y have no joint distribution.  What could p(y,Y) possibly mean?  It would involve defining things such as Pr(y=2,Y=4), which sounds sort of funny given that we're usually talking about Pr(Y=y).  If you're careful you can probably get the right answer, but you have to be really careful when working with Y and y, sometimes treating them as two separate creatures and sometimes not.  It's notation that's a hindrance to understanding, rather than being the sort that actually moves our logic along.</p>

<p>That's why Xiao-Li, Hal, and I <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/A6n41.pdf">switched</a> to a more formal notation, defining y (the data that have been observed or will be observed in the current experiment) and y.rep (future data; data that <em>could</em> be observed if the model were true).  The graphical model goes like this:</p>

<p>theta --> (y, y.rep).</p>

<p>It's tricky for me to draw the branching in Ascii so that it shows up correctly on the blog, but the idea is for there to be two arrows forking from theta, one arrow to y and the other to y.rep.  y and y.rep are conditionally independent given theta.  And so there is a mathematically defined joint distribution:</p>

<p>p (y, y.rep, theta) = p(theta) p(y|theta) p(y.rep|theta),</p>

<p>and thus there is also a posterior predictive distribution, p(y.rep|y), formed by conditioning on y and averaging over theta (which we typically do using simulation rather than analytic integration), and we can do graphical predictive checks, compute p-values and all the rest.</p>

<p>All of this is by way of preface to my discussion with Judith Rousseau about her work on posterior predictive checks, which she <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2009/11/im_speaking_at.html">refers to</a> as "double use of the data."</p>

<p>I think a big stumbling block for Rousseau is her use of the (Y,y) notation, which limits what she can do because Y and y are not treated symmetrically and it's awkward in her notation to work with the all-important joint distribution of parameters, data, and replicated data.</p>

<p>There is no "double use of the data" in posterior predictive checks.  We're conditioning on the data exactly once, as always in Bayesian inference.</p>

<p>But Rousseau (following Berger and others) does raise a practical concern, which is that the distribution of a posterior predictive p-value (that is, the distribution of possible values it could attain, if the model (including the prior distribution) were true), is not uniform (except in special cases when the test statistic is pivotal, so that its distribution does not depend on theta).  As Xiao-Li, Hal, and I showed, the distribution of the posterior-predictive distribution is stochastically less variable than uniform, which typically means that, if the model is true, you're less likely to get extreme p-values than you might think, given their nominal values.  (For example, if the model is true, you'll typically have less than a 5% chance that a particular p-value will be less than 0.05.  (What we proved in our paper was that the probability is less than 2p, or 10% in this case, but in just about all the examples we've seen, the probability is less than p itself.)</p>

<p>This behavior has led posterior predictive p-values to be called "conservative" or "uncalibrated," but I <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2007/10/controversies_o.html">don't think</a> that's a correct description.  I'd prefer to say that, in the presence of uncertainty about parameters, the p-value--the probability, if the model is true, of seeing something more extreme than the observed data--is not in general a u-value, where the latter is <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~cook/movabletype/archives/2009/05/handy_statistic.html">defined</a> as a data summary that has a uniform distribution if the model is true.  As Xiao-Li, Hal, and I discussed, <em>prior</em> predictive p-values are u-values, but there are lots of reasons for preferring posterior predictive checks instead, the principal reason being that it's the posterior distribution that's being using as an inferential summary going forward from the data analysis.</p>

<p><strong>Differences in notation and terminology aside, though, Rousseau is wrestling with real issues:</strong></p>

<p><em>1.  How useful are posterior predictive checks, really, if they're so conservative that they don't reject false models often enough?</em>  (If a test does not reject the true model at the nominal level, it's a safe bet that it doesn't reject false models very often either; in statistical jargon, it will have "low power.")</p>

<p><em>2.  If we consider predictive checks not as a way of obtaining accept-reject rules but rather as summaries of model fit (as in chapter 6 of BDA), then how exactly can they be interpreted?</em>  To be understood at all, do p-values first need to be "calibrated" and transformed to a uniform distribution?</p>

<p>I will address both these concerns in turn.</p>

<p><strong>1.</strong>  My goal in model checking is not to reject false models (or, for that matter, true models).  All the models I work with are false, and a simple hypothetical (sometimes called "pre-posterior") analysis reveals that, with enough data, I would be able to reject any model I might have.  The chi-squared test is a measure of sample size, and all that.  So I don't see "statistical power" as an issue in this setting.</p>

<p>If that's true, you might ask, why do I test models at all?  Or, to take a slightly weaker position, would I be happy if someone were to add noise to all my model checks?  Sure, this would hurt my statistical power, but I just said I didn't care about that, right?  This point is a good one, and I'll get back to it in a bit.</p>

<p>To return to my main thread:  I check models not to "reject" (or to "accept" or "not-reject") them but to understand the ways in which they do not match available data and our current understanding.  See my discussion of a recent paper by Bayarri and Castillo for further discussion of this point.  There are different sorts of model checks corresponding to comparisons of the posterior distribution to different sorts of knowledge:  prior-posterior comparisons, cross-validation, external validation, and comparisons of predictions to observed data.  It is this last that people typically are talking about when they talk about posterior predictive checks, and which I view as a generalization of classical hypothesis testing and exploratory data analysis.</p>

<p>For an example of a model check from my recent applied work, see here.</p>

<p>Any particular model check is an evaluation of some particular use of a model.  The key reason I'm not concerned with the power of a posterior predictive test is that I don't treat non-rejection as acceptance.  If the data fit the model under a particular test (that is, if T(y) is well within the distribution of T(y.rep)), that's fine--but it doesn't stop the model from having problems in other ways.  A test with low power simply reflects a data summary--a test statistic--that the model happens to be able to automatically (with high probability) fit well from data.  That's what models are often supposed to do--the normal model, for example, does a good job of fitting the sample mean--and it's fine to be able to check this.</p>

<p>I still care about statistical power, though--see chapter 20 of ARM, for example, or my recent <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/power4r.pdf">article</a> with David Weakliem.  The version of statistical power that I care about is the ability of model-and-data to estimate some parameter of interest, or to distinguish between models.  But I would generally do this using Bayesian inference on the parameters, not using model checking.</p>

<p><strong>2.</strong>  Various statisticians have argued that posterior predictive p-values are not calibrated  because they do not have a uniform distribution under the null hypothesis.  My answer to this criticism is:  Just interpret them directly as probabilities!  The sample space for a posterior predictive check--the set of all possible events whose probabilities sum to 1--comes from the posterior distribution of y.rep.  If a posterior predictive p-value is 0.4, say, that means that, if we believe the model, we think there's a 40% chance that tomorrow's value of T(y.rep) will exceed today's T(y).  If we were able to observe such replications in many settings, we could collect them and check that, indeed, this happens 40% of the time when the p-value is 0.4, that it happens 30% of the time when the p-value is 0.3, and so forth.  (Of course, this won't really happen--our models aren't actually true--but that's how probability always goes.)  These things are as calibrated as any other model-based probability, for example a statement such as, "From a roll of this particular pair of loaded dice, the probability of getting double-sixes is 0.11," or, There is a 50% probability that Barack Obama won more than 52% of the white vote in Michigan."</p>

<p><strong>Two examples, one where calibration makes sense and one where it does't</strong></p>

<p>As I wrote at the beginning (several screens gone, at this point), I think Rousseau is considering some important issues, and I'd like to explore them further via a couple of simple theoretical examples in which the posterior distribution is far from uniform.</p>

<p>In the first example, I think the nonuniform low-powered posterior predictive distribution is fine, and I don't see Rousseau's recalibration idea as making much sense at all; rather, it destroys the useful meaning of the test.  In the second example, however, the noise in the predictive distribution makes the raw test (and its p-value) essentially unusable, and recalibration fixes the problem.</p>

<p>The research question, then, is to understand the difference between these examples and come up with a generally useful way of understanding calibration procedures in predictive testing.</p>

<p><em>Example 1:  Testing the sample mean as fit by a normal distribution.</em>  Consider the data model, y ~ N (theta, 1), prior distribution theta ~ N (0, A^2), with A set to some high value such as 100 (that is, a noninformative prior distribution).  We will use as the test statistic the sample mean, y.  (In this case, y is just a single data point, but that's just for mathematical convenience.  The point is that we're using the sample mean or regression coefficient to test the fit of a normal linear model.)</p>

<p>The short answer is that this test will essentially never reject.  In fact, the posterior predictive p-value, Pr (y.rep > y | y), is going to be near 0.5 for just about any y that might reasonably come from this model.</p>

<p>Here's the math:<br />
theta|y ~ N (A^2/(A^2+1) y, A^2/(A^2+1))<br />
y.rep|y ~ N (A^2/(A^2+1) y, 1 + A^2/(A^2+1))<br />
posterior predictive p-value is Phi(-(y - E(y.rep|y))/sd(y.rep|y)) = Phi (-(1/(A^2+1))*y/sqrt((2A^2+1)/(A^2+1)))<br />
marginal (prior predictive) distribution of y:  N(0,A^2+1).</p>

<p>Plugging in A=100, the posterior predictive p-value for data y is Phi (-y/14000), so to get a (one-sided) p-value of 0.025, you need y>28000, an extremely unlikely event if the marginal distribution of y is N(0,100^2).  Even in the extremely unlikely event of y=500 (that is, five standard deviations away from the mean, under the prior predictive distribution), the p-value is still only Phi (500/14000) = .486.  Thus, in this example, we can be virtually certain that the p-value will fall between .48 and .52.</p>

<p>But the p-value can be calibrated to have a uniform distribution under the prior predictive distribution.  The recalibrated p-value is simply the normal distribution function evaluated at y/sqrt(A^2+1).  For example, with A=100 and y=500, this recalibrated p-value will be 3*10^-7.</p>

<p>But this is not what I want!  Let's continue with this example in which A=100 and the observed data are y=500.  Sure, this is an unexpected value, clearly inconsistent with the prior distribution, and worthy of ringing the alarm in a prior predictive test.  But what about the <em>posterior</em> distribution?  Here, the model is working just fine:   p(theta|y) = N (theta | 499.95, 0.99995^2).  In this case, even though it is contradicted by the data, the prior distribution is acting noninformatively.  The posterior distribution is fine, and an extreme p-value would be inappropriate.</p>

<p>To put it another way, consider this example, with data y=500, and consider sliding the value of A--the prior scale--from 50 to 5000.  As this prior scale changes, there is essentially no change in the posterior distribution:  under all these values, p(theta|y) is extremely close to N(theta|500,1).  And, correspondingly, the posterior predictive p-value for the test statistic T(y)=y is close to 0.5.  The u-value, however--the p-value recalibrated to have a uniform prior predictive distribution--changes a lot.  I don't like the u-value as a measure of model fit, as it is sensitive to aspects of the model that have essentially no influence on the posterior distribution.  The point is that the same mean really is well estimated by a normal linear model.  This is not "conservatism" or "low power"; it's just the way it is.  I have no particular need for p-values to have a uniform distribution or anything like that.  I interpret the p-value directly as a probability statement on y.rep.</p>

<p><em>Example 2:  Testing skewness in the presence of huge amounts of missing data.</em></p>

<p>OK, now, as promised, an example where my posterior predictive p-value gives a bad answer but Rousseau's recalibration succeeds.  Consider the normal model with n independent data points, y.i ~ N (theta, 1), a flat prior distribution on theta (OK, theta ~ N(0,A^2) with a very high value of A), and using the sample skewness as a test statistic: T(y) = (1/n)*sum(((y.i - y.bar)/s.y)^3).  This test statistic is pivotal, thus its p-value (which can be calculated using the t distribution function) is also a u-value.</p>

<p>So far so good.  Now we muddy the waters by supposing that n=1000 but with only 10 values observed; the other 990 cases are missing.  And we still want to use the sample skewness as a test statistic.</p>

<p>Of course we could simply compute the sample skewness of the 10 observations; this will yield a p-value (and a u-value) that is just find.  But that would be cheating.  We want to do our test on the full, completed data--all 1000 observations--using the Bayes posterior distribution to average over the 990 missing values.</p>

<p>This should work fine under recalibration, I think--I haven't checked the details--all the noise introduced by the missing data gets averaged over in the calibration step.  But the straight posterior predictive check won't work so well.  The problem is that the test statistic will be dominated by the 990 imputed values.  These will be imputed under the model--that's what "averaging over the posterior distribution" is--and so it will be virtually impossible for the test to reveal any problem.</p>

<p>What the posterior predictive test is saying here is that the sample skewness of a new set of 10000 observations will look similar to that of 1000 observations so far, if the model is in fact true.  This is fine as a mathematical statement but not so relevant for practical evaluation of model fit.</p>

<p>OK, so here we have two examples where, if the model is true or close to true, the posterior predictive p-value will almost certainly be very close to 0.5.  In the first example (checking the sample mean under a normal model), this is just fine; in the second example (with 99% missing data), it doesn't work so well.  The challenge now is to isolate what's going on and express it as a general principle which can guide applied model checking.</p>]]>
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