

.465; $p = .000$). Students who identified themselves as Christian or Catholic indicated higher levels of religious involvement. This relationship held about equally true in “red” and “blue” states. The distribution of religious affiliations also varied between the two groups of states: There were more Christian and slightly more Catholic students in the “red” states than in the “blue” states; in contrast, there were more unaffiliated, Jewish, and “other” students in the “blue” states than in the “red” states. Because of these factors, it seems likely that bloc differences in political attitudes were explained by both particular religious ideologies and level of religious commitment (religiosity). The high correlation between religious affiliation and self-rated religious involvement makes it easy to confound the two.

The relationship between religious ideology and political attitudes is correlational, and one needs to look further for an explanation of their impact. A number of studies indicate relationships between religious fundamentalism and what Jost has termed *system-justifying ideologies* (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Such ideologies justify militant nationalism and mistrust of others who are not part of one’s group (see Unger, 2002, for a review of these studies). For example, people who have strong beliefs in religious fundamentalism are also likely to score high in right-wing authoritarianism. This relationship has been confirmed among individuals from a number of religious backgrounds—Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Hindu. It also appears in studies of other cultures. Research in Ghana found that right-wing authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism were associated in both Christian and Muslim subsamples.

Positivist ideology has also been found to be associated with religiosity in Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish students in the United States and in Jewish, Christian, and Muslim students in Israel. Positivism is defined as belief in the validity of external reality and the legitimacy of some form of authority external to oneself; belief that one’s values and those of one’s source of authority are universally true; and preference for deterministic rather than relativistic explanations of various social issues (Unger, Draper, & Pendergrass, 1986). Most recently, positivist ideology has been found to predict a militant response to September 11, 2001, and to be correlated with religiosity in some groups of students (Unger, Gareis, & Locher, 2007).

Both political conservatism and religious orthodoxy are related to many of the variables discussed by Jost (2006). A recent Italian study found, for example, sig-

nificant relationships between high need for closure, heightened nationalism, preference for autocratic leadership, and a centralized form of political power (Chirumbolo, Areni, & Sensales, 2004). Those who were high in need for closure also valued religiosity more than did individuals who scored lower on the measure and were less supportive of pluralism and multiculturalism. They were also more likely to have voted for a candidate from a right-wing party than were individuals with less need for closure.

Archival studies indicate that the relationship between religiosity, political conservatism, and nationalism is not new. There is evidence that U.S. citizens elected presidents who radiated strength and energy by wide margins during years of high threat (McCann, 1997). The impact of threat extends beyond political behaviors. During periods of threat, Americans have been found to be more likely to attend churches that strictly adhered to doctrine than to attend less orthodox churches (McCann, 1999). During periods of high economic and social threat, Americans are also more likely to engage in behaviors indicative of authoritarianism such as joining the Ku Klux Klan (Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991).

In sum, religiosity has been largely ignored by psychologists interested in social and political behaviors. It is quite possible that religiosity is related to the various personality dimensions discussed by Jost (2006). But we cannot learn more about these potential connections if we continue to ignore the importance of religious ideology as a psychological variable.

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Coda—After “The End of the End of Ideology”

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In a hard-hitting book titled *Conservatives Without Conscience*, the well-known Nixon attorney-turned-whistleblower John Dean (2006, pp. 28–31 and 211–212) catalogued the numerous ways in which right-wing pundits have attacked, caricatured, and (knowingly or unknowingly) misrepresented recent work in political psychology, including work that I am proud to have been part of (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 2003b). After a few years of ad hominem attacks by Ann Coulter, Jonah Goldberg, Rush Limbaugh, George Will, and countless right-wing bloggers, it is refreshing to have qualified scholars and social scientists address our work more substantively and more honestly (see also Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Tetlock, 2007, pp. 905–908). I am grateful to Glassman and Karno (2007) and Unger (2007) for their constructive, thoughtful engagement with the ever-increasing scientific corpus suggesting that—contrary to the claims of the “end of ideologists”—political ideology plays an important (albeit often underappreciated) role in people’s everyday lives (see Jost, October 2006).

The fact is that most (but by no means all) Americans are willing and able to lo-

cate their attitudes on a bipolar liberalism–conservatism dimension, and these self-placements reliably predict their voting behavior and many other important outcomes including beliefs, opinions, values, traits, and behaviors (e.g., Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Jost, 2006). Compared with liberals and moderates, conservatives score significantly higher on psychological instruments designed to measure epistemic needs for order, structure, simplicity, certainty, and closure, and they score significantly higher on instruments designed to measure the intensity of existential concerns such as fear of death and perceptions of a dangerous world (Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b; Jost et al., 2007). In terms of basic personality dimensions, liberals (and leftists) score significantly higher on Openness to New Experiences, and their greater open-mindedness manifests itself in terms of creativity, curiosity, novelty, diversity, and interest in travel. By contrast, conservatives (and rightists) score higher on Conscientiousness, and they are generally more orderly, organized, duty-bound, conventional, and more likely to follow rules (see Carney, Jost, & Gosling, 2007; Jost, 2006; Stenner, 2005). The evidence strongly contradicts the commonly held assumption expressed by Mehrabian (1996), among others, that political orientation is “consistently and strikingly unrelated to personality and temperament factors” (p. 469). Neither Glassman and Karno (2007) nor Unger (2007) challenge any of the data I summarized in my original article (Jost, 2006), and—although I may not be prepared to embrace every single sentence in their commentaries—my sense is that we agree far more than we disagree.

To begin with, I thank Glassman and Karno (2007) for returning me to my philosophical roots and reminding me of my fondness for the work of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead, whose writings I drew on more explicitly years ago (e.g., Jost, 1995, especially pp. 8–18). Glassman and Karno argued in favor of an “instrumental pragmatist” approach to the study of ideology that emphasizes the *strategic, purposive, goal-directed* nature of political rhetoric and belief. So far so good; I agree that such an approach is helpful and empirically sound. In fact, this is very similar to what my colleagues and I meant when we wrote that political conservatism and liberalism are forms of “motivated social cognition” (Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b). People do possess certain psychological needs (e.g., for safety, security, certainty, conviction, and solidarity), and their desire to satisfy these needs leads them to embrace specific

ideological belief systems. This does indeed mean that a variety of peripheral social and political attitudes come “along for the ride,” to use Glassman and Karno’s (2007, p. 1075) felicitous phrase.

In any case, I did not mean to suggest that the relationship between ideology and activity is “unidirectional” or to foreclose the “possibility that immediate ideological positions are the residue of purposeful activity” (Glassman & Karno, 2007, p. 1075). On the contrary, Bonanno’s and my analysis of “conservative shift” among survivors of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center indicates that people may turn to “relatively simple, yet cognitively rigid ideologies (e.g., good vs. evil, black vs. white, us vs. them, leader vs. follower)” in an effort to cope with threat and distress (Bonanno & Jost, 2006, p. 311). Because, at least in the Western world, simple (vs. complex) ideologies are more commonly espoused by right-wing than left-wing ideologues (Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b; Tetlock, 2007), heightened needs to reduce threat and uncertainty lead people to shift their attitudes—“purposefully,” I assume, but not necessarily self-consciously—disproportionately in a conservative rather than liberal (or progressive) direction (Jost, Fitzsimons, & Kay, 2004; Landau et al., 2004; Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007). In this sense, political conservatism and other “system-justifying” ideologies serve the palliative function of making people feel better about their current predicament and the status quo more generally (see Jost & Hunyady, 2005).

I heartily agree with Glassman and Karno (2007, p. 1076) that ideological movements are often orchestrated by elites (e.g., party leaders) for strategic political purposes in a top-down manner (see also Zaller, 1992, for an excellent discussion of such processes). At the same time, however, my impression is that because political scientists have for several decades assimilated the skeptical “end of ideology” conclusions drawn by Daniel Bell, Edward Shils, Raymond Aron, Seymour Lipset, and Philip Converse (see Jost, 2006; Knight, 2006), they have neglected bottom-up social and psychological processes that help to explain why followers are so eager to respond to the ideological appeals of their leaders. As I suggested in my original article (Jost, 2006, p. 658), conservative elites have in recent years stoked moral and ideological passions that many political scientists believed did not exist (e.g., Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2006).

There are a few other points on which Glassman and Karno (2007) seem to misunderstand me. By saying that ideology is motivated, I certainly did not mean to imply that it is always irrational or even nonrational (see also Jost, 2006, p. 665, for my response to George Will on this point). By the same token, I doubt that Glassman and Karno really wanted to claim that ideological beliefs are “always” rational. (They offered no precise definition of the term *rational*, and I wonder if terms such as *functional* or *adaptive* would have captured their intent better.) What I think is that most ideologies combine both rational (i.e., logical, internally consistent, reality-based, and perhaps even self-interested) and rationalizing (i.e., psycho-logical, not necessarily consistent, motive-based, and potentially self-deceptive) elements. Furthermore, I think that people can be guided by ideological motives without necessarily being aware of it. In the classic 1970s sitcom *All in the Family*, for instance, Archie Bunker was probably far more ideological than he ever realized. For this reason, I sought to put more critical distance between the concepts of ideology and political sophistication than political scientists since Converse have tended to see (Jost, 2006, p. 657; see also Gerring, 1997, for a similar position).

Glassman and Karno (2007) wrote, “Reifying ideology into an object of control can be dangerous,” and they seem to suggest that linking psychological needs to political opinions gives people a “free pass” (p. 1076). I do not think that this is the case. One can simultaneously critique the manifest content of an ideology and still understand why it possesses psychological resonance. I do generally agree, however, with Glassman and Karno that the architects of the so-called “Southern strategy” for pulling White southerners over from the Democratic to the Republican party “combined fear of change with Conservative ideology that included a more expensive military (tied to law and order), lower taxes (tied to not coddling ‘others’ with welfare programs), and an assault on secular humanism (tied to the need to maintain traditional values)” (p. 1076). I also agree that Bill O’Reilly’s “War on Christmas” is “tied to perceived attacks on people’s way of life” (p. 1076) and that Virgil Goode’s denunciation of a Muslim Congressman represents “an attempt to create new segments within the Conservative ideology by stoking individual fears” (p. 1076). From my perspective, these political elites (and many others) are effectively exploiting the very same

psychological principles that my colleagues and I have sought to identify and understand (e.g., Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2007). In other words, our theoretical and empirical analysis is useful for explaining how and why these political strategies are so successful, and perhaps it will also be useful in designing effective countermeasures, if one is motivated to do so.

Unger (2007) pointed out, quite correctly, that I said relatively little about the role of religious ideology in my discussion of ideological polarization in the United States. The ideological gulf between religious traditionalists and secular humanists has indeed been widening since 1980, and it corresponds strongly to right–left differences in political attitudes (e.g., Layman, 1997; Layman & Carmines, 1997). I mentioned, somewhat cryptically, at the end of my article that “similarly fruitful analyses could be undertaken with respect to religious and other belief systems” (Jost, 2006, p. 667), and I am grateful for Unger’s invitation to elaborate on this point. Rather than ignoring the role of religion in politics, my doctoral student, Jaime Napier, and I have been using our theory of ideology as motivated social cognition (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2007) to understand the frequent co-occurrence of religiosity and political conservatism (e.g., see Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Mehrabian, 1996).

Specifically, Napier and Jost (2006) found, using data from the 2000 World Values Survey, that in the United States, the correlation between religiosity and right-wing political orientation is approximately .30, which means that it is as strong as the correlations between education and income, gender and weight, and exposure to media violence and aggression (e.g., Bushman & Anderson, 2001; Meyer et al., 2001). Furthermore, we demonstrated that, after adjusting for individuals’ scores on measures of uncertainty avoidance (measured in terms of ambiguity intolerance, need for order and structure, and low openness) and perceptions of danger and threat, the correlation between religiosity and right-wing orientation disappears entirely. We replicated these results in several other countries included in the World Values Survey, which suggests that the phenomenon is by no means restricted to the United States. Thus, our uncertainty-threat model of ideology as motivated social cognition may in fact explain why religiosity and political conservatism are so frequently intertwined!

Unger (2007) also suggested that *positivism*, which she defined in multidimen-

sional terms as “belief in the validity of external reality and the legitimacy of some form of authority external to oneself; belief that one’s values and those of one’s source of authority are universally true; and preference for deterministic rather than relativistic explanations of various social issues” (p. 1077), is a feature of both politically conservative and religiously orthodox belief systems. My sense is that terms such as *absolutism* or *fundamentalism* would be more accurate insofar as the common factor underlying conservative and religious belief systems appears to be a general form of dogmatism rather than a specific approach to the philosophy of science. In point of fact, logical positivism in science prizes direct forms of empirical observation as opposed to appeals to authority, and it therefore stands in strong contrast to religious points of view. Nevertheless, I do agree with Unger that liberals and leftists are more open to “relativistic” thinking in domains of science as well as morality, probably because of their greater tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty, but I may disagree with her about whether this is an asset. Although I believe that some useful lessons came from the “social constructionist” movement in psychology and related disciplines, I also think that “postmodernist” epistemology has done more to discredit leftist intellectuals than to strengthen them (e.g., see Jost & Kruglanski, 2002). Similarly, liberals have made it far too easy for their conservative adversaries to accuse them of moral relativism by failing to articulate and defend the foundations of their ethical commitments.

In conclusion, I wish to thank Glassman and Karno (2007) and Unger (2007) for engaging my (Jost, 2006) article on “The End of the End of Ideology.” I found their comments to be constructive and stimulating, and they have helped me to clarify my own thinking on several points. Once social and behavioral scientists are in a position to grant (as a matter of professional consensus) that ideology matters even to “ordinary” citizens, that it is rooted in fundamental epistemic and existential needs and motives, and that it can be studied scientifically with the tools of psychology, then we can finally make real, substantive progress on understanding what Silvan Tomkins (1963, p. 389) provocatively described as “a love affair of a loosely organized set of feelings and ideas about feelings with a highly organized and articulate set of ideas.”

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Building More Solid Bridges Between Buddhism and Western Psychology

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Introducing the ways of cultivating mental balance, Wallace and Shapiro (October 2006) attempted to build bridges between Buddhism and psychology. Their systematic categorization of Buddhist teachings and extensive review of empirical support from Western psychology are valuable for future study. However, it remains a matter of concern that some more profound parts of Buddhist philosophy can be disregarded by focusing only on practical aspects of Buddhism within the context of mental health. In this comment, we briefly address four substantial themes to be considered.

Reality

Buddha's *Dhammapada* opens with "All that we are is the result of what we have thought: It is founded on our thought, it is made of our thoughts" (Müller, 1898, p. 3). This statement obviously denies the notion of a pre-given world and strongly challenges the tradition of objectivism on which almost all psychological sciences are founded. Yet, it is important to acknowledge the subjective nature of Buddhism on another front. Indeed, some subjective approaches in psychology have become separated from mainstream psychology during the past three decades. But it is not that a blind eye should be turned to subjective aspects of Buddhism. What deserves special mention here is that the resonance between Buddhist and constructivist epistemologies is increasingly apparent (Mahoney, 2003). Constructivists' assertion that people are active agents who continuously construct themselves and the world has increasingly been supported by contemporary cognitive science, and this idea is gaining currency especially in the areas of clinical, counseling, and educational psychology.

Identity

Among a number of Buddhist ideas, the concept of *interdependent co-origination (pratityasamutpada)* is a fundamental doctrine representing the content of Buddha's enlightenment. For example, Nagarjuna held that everything exists only in relation to all other things and denied any form of

independent self-nature (Garfield, 1995). Although traditional psychology tends to view the self as a fixed entity, there is emerging research that holds otherwise radically. Gergen and Kaye (1992) noted from a social constructionist standpoint,

the relationship takes priority over the individual self. That is, selves are only realized as a by-product of relatedness. It is not independent selves who come together to form a relationship, but particular forms of relationship that engender what we take to be the individual's identity. (p. 180)

Exploration of the relation between Buddhism and social constructionism has just started (Gergen & Hosking, 2006), and further research is needed to reveal suggestions for Western psychology.

Causality

The notion of interdependent co-origination also has an insight about cause-effect relations. This concept was later elaborated into the ideas of *jujumujin* and of one-*soku*-many/many-*soku*-one, by the *Kegon* sect of Buddhism. *Jujumujin* refers to the characteristic that everything is interconnected, interacted, and integrated. *Soku* stands for "that is" or "equivalent." The *Kegon*'s theory of causality bears a considerable resemblance to the sciences of complex systems where a part depends on the whole and the whole system emerges out of the interactions of subcomponents (Haruki, 1997). Experimental psychology generally attempts to describe or predict human experience and development on the basis of linear models. Strictly speaking, however, every psychological phenomenon can be a result and cause of dynamic interaction of all other psychological, sociological, and physical phenomena. Theories and methods of complex systems science may be effective to integrate Buddhism with psychology in an elaborated manner.

Logicity

One last point is that Buddhism is inherently in discordance with Western logic. Although logic and its language play essential roles in every branch of knowledge, Buddhism, especially Zen, aims to go beyond them and strives to deny all kinds of conceptualization. Suzuki (1914/1964) articulated that

We generally think that "A is A" is absolute, and that the proposition "A is not-A" or "A is B" is unthinkable. . . . The meaning of the proposition "A is A" is realized only when "A is not-A." To be itself is not to be itself—this is the logic of Zen. (pp. 59–60)

Thus, Buddhism is opposed to Western logic, including social constructionism,

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