A Generational Voting Model for Forecasting the 2020 American Presidential Election

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Abstract

We predict how the political events that occurred during the Trump administration will factor into the 2020 American Presidential Election. We begin by motivating the advantage of a generational voting model, in which voters’ partisan preferences are modeled as a running tally of impressions left by the political events they live through. We then state the model explicitly. Finally, we predict how different generations will respond to the political events that occurred during the Trump presidency. Our results raise new questions about the comparability of generations in an era of extreme political polarization.

Introduction

The outcome of the 2020 American presidential election will depend on how voters assess the political events that occurred during the Trump administration—from the aftermath of the 2016 election, Mueller Report, and impeachment hearings to the coronavirus pandemic, recession, and widespread protests. Although unprecedented in several respects, it is because history repeats that past elections provide a scientific basis for predicting how voters will assess these events. The challenge is determining the manner in which history repeats, and thus the exact relevance of past elections, which may only be clear long after the 2020 election.

We predict how voters will assess the political events of the Trump administration using using the generational voting approach of Ghitza, Gelman, and Auerbach (2020) (see paper for details). The model builds on political socialization theory, which describes how political events influence voting behavior (for example, see Hyman (1959), Campbell et al. (1960), and Jennings and Markus (1981)). Generally speaking, the value of this or any theory is that, if the underlying assumptions are reasonable, the problem of predicting a complex phenomenon such as voting behavior is reduced to a manageable number of unknown factors. The advantage of political socialization theory specifically is that the assumptions are supported by decades of research, transparent, and easily discussed among experts or communicated to a lay audience. We believe this advantage is particularly desirable given the unusual circumstances in which the 2020 election will take place.

We proceed in three sections. We first motivate the main assumption underlying our generational voting model, which permits the comparison of voters across generations. We then describe the data and model (for related literature, see for example Burnham (1970), Beck and Jennings (1979), and Beck (1991)). Finally, we forecast how voters will assess the political events that occurred during the Trump presidency. Our main finding is that Generation Z has become more Democratic over the course of the Trump administration, but appear to lean only slightly Democratic overall when compared to previous generations—raising questions about the comparability of generations in our era of extreme political polarization.

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1. We use the Gallup Organization’s presidential approval rating time series to compare voters across generations.

Political socialization theory provides a broad framework for understanding how voters assess political events. To summarize, political events make impressions on voters, and the cumulative weight of those impressions determines which candidate a voter prefers. While every impression is unique, they typically coincide with a voter’s demographic characteristics—such as age, race, ethnicity, and sex—reflecting the common conditions under which voters experience political events.

Forecasting an election with political socialization theory requires modeling how voters form their impressions. The model is then extrapolated to predict the impressions left by new political events. The problem is that both the political events and the manner in which voters assess them change over time, and the two must be disentangled before prediction is possible. For example, that older voters prefer conservative candidates could reflect the fact that voters become more conservative with age or the fact that the current generation of older voters acquired conservative-leaning ideologies from political events unique to their adolescence. In the first case, we would expect future voters to become more conservative with age, while in the second case, we would expect future voters to retain their childhood ideologies, all else equal.

The natural solution is to compare voters from different generations when they were the same age and of arguably similar impressionability. Continuing the previous example, we could calculate the proportion of the older generation’s conservative leanings that are due to adolescence by comparing the childhood of this generation to the childhoods of other generations. Such comparisons fill our public discourse, from the specific advice beginning “if I were your age . . .” to the general nostalgia of a previous generation. However, there are any number of ways to compare two childhoods, and few articulate what exactly they mean if they were another’s age. (Strictly speaking, if you were another’s age, you would share their experiences and thus behave like them, although that is rarely what anyone means.) Even seasoned researchers speak casually about the effect of age without clarification.

The conceptual ambiguity inherent in intergenerational comparisons extends to all concomitant variables—variables that cannot be manipulated experimentally and represent abstract experiences whose relevance is subjective and case dependent, such as age, race, ethnicity, and sex. In order to fully realize the advantages of political socialization theory, namely transparent and easily communicated predictions, we must be explicit how different generations are compared. Our approach uses the Gallup Organization’s presidential approval rating time series to represent political events and capture the changing zeitgeist; our main assumption is that voters who live through similar ratings adopt similar political ideologies. The approval ratings thus permit the comparison of voters across generations, not unlike how the consumer price index permits the comparison of prices across generations or the human development index permits the comparison of standard of living. The following section describes how exactly we make these comparisons, and the final section questions whether approval ratings sufficiently capture our new era of political polarization.

2. We model partisan preferences as a running tally of impressions left by the political events.

We assemble a dataset of responses to public opinion surveys about the American presidential election from five sources: (1) the ANES (elections 1952-2016), (2) the Gallup presidential polling dataset from the Roper Center’s iPoll database (1952-2016), (3) the Annenberg National Election Studies (2000, 2004, and 2008), (4) the Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research internal campaign polls (2012), and (5) the CNN/ORC and Pew polls (2016). The dataset has 215,693 complete responses after discarding undecided voters.

Let $a = \{1, 2, \ldots, 70\}$ denote the age of the respondent, $p = \{1956, 1960, \ldots, 2016\}$ the year of the response, $g = \{\text{non-Southern white male}, \text{Southern white male}, \text{minority male}, \text{non-Southern white female}, \text{Southern white female}, \text{and minority female}\}$ the demographic group of the respondent, and $h = \{\text{Annenberg, Gallup, NES, GQRR, CNN/ORC/Pew}\}$ the survey house that collected the response. We group all minority respondents together by sex since the data does not distinguish consistently between minority groups in early years; white refers to non-Hispanic white.
We also collect the Gallup Organization’s long-running presidential approval rating time series from August 1937 to June 2020. Let $x_t$ denote the Republican-directional presidential approval rating in year $t$, which is calculated by (1) subtracting 50% from the Gallup presidential approval rating in the year $t$, and (2) multiplying the difference by $-1$ if the sitting president was a Democrat.

The covariates, $a, p, g$ and $h$, partition respondents into mutually exclusive cells. For each cell, $j$, we denote the age, period, group, and source of the responses by $a[j], p[j], g[j]$, and $h[j]$. Let $y_j$ denote the number of respondents supporting the Republican candidate in cell $j$, and $n_j$ the number preferring either the Republican or Democratic candidate. We model

$$y_j \sim \text{Binomial}(n_j, \theta_j),$$

where $\theta_j$ is the proportion supporting the Republican presidential candidate within cell $j$.

We decompose $\theta_j$ into four effects. We define a generational effect as the running tally of impressions left by the political events experienced by the voters of cell $j$ up until period $p[j]$,

$$\gamma_j = \Omega_g \sum_{i=1}^{a[j]} w_i x_{p[j]} - a[j] + i$$

where $w_i$ denotes the age-specific weight of the rating at age $i$, and $\Omega_g$ denotes the scale of the age-specific weights for group $g$.

We define a period effect for each group, $\beta_{pg}$, a period and age-weight interaction, $\lambda_g w_a \beta_{pg}$, and an election effect,

$$B_j = \beta_{pg} + \lambda_g w_a \beta_{pg} = (1 + \lambda_g w_a) \beta_{pg}$$

We also define an age effect $\alpha_a$ and a house effect $\eta_h$. Put together, these effects sum to $\theta_j$ on the logit scale,

$$\logit(\theta_j) = \alpha_a + B_j + \gamma_j + \eta_h$$

We smooth the age weights,

$$w_i \sim \text{Normal}(w_{i-1}, 0.01),$$

and specify normal distributions for $\alpha$, $\beta$, and $\eta$ with mean zero and standard deviations $\sigma_\alpha$, $\sigma_\beta$, and $\sigma_\eta$. The scale parameters, $\lambda$ and $\Omega$, are constrained to be positive.

3. Our model suggests the political events of the Trump administration will have smaller influence on average than the events experienced by previous generations of the same age.

We fit our generational model with Stan (Carpenter et al. (2017)) using the R (R Core Team (2020)) package cmdstanr (Gabry and Češnovar (2020)). We sample 4 chains for 2000 iterations each. In each iteration, we generate $\hat{\theta}_j$, the proportion supporting the Republican presidential candidate, for all groups, ages 0 to 70, and years 1937 to 2020. NOTE: We set $\beta_{pg} = \beta_{2016g}$ and $\eta = 0$ so that the $\hat{\theta}_j$ are comparable across years—at this time there is insufficient data to estimate $\beta_{2020g}$. We ensure satisfactory diagnostic and posterior predictive performance (Gelman et al. (2013)) before using sample quantiles for estimates (median) and credible intervals in the following five figures. Darker intervals represent 50 percent posterior regions and lighter intervals represent 95 percent regions.
Figures 1-4 each examine four age groups of voters representing four different generations—18-year-olds (Generation Z), 35-year-olds (Millennials), 52-year-olds (Generation X), and 68-year-olds (Baby Boomers). The top half shows the estimated Republican support from that age group since 1950. Generation Z and Millennials lean Democratic compared to previous voters of that age, while Generation X and Baby Boomers lean Republican. The bottom half shows how the political events experienced by the different generations (labeled by birth year for consistency across Figures) have shaped their political ideology. Each generation is politically agnostic at age 0. They then develop unique trajectories of partisan preferences according to the political events they live through—displayed up until the age of the current generation. Under our model, younger generations have become more Democratic from the events experienced during the Trump administration. For non-minority Generation Z and Millennials, the shift is smaller than past generations, suggesting recent political events have had a smaller on average influence than the events experienced by older generations at the same age. For older generations, such as Generation X and Baby Boomers, and minorities of all generations, the change is consistent with previous generations.

We conclude by revisiting our main assumption: that approval ratings permit intergenerational comparisons. If this assumption is reasonable, one explanation for our findings is that the Internet and 24-hour news cycle have dampened the long-term influence of political events. If this assumption is not reasonable, as recent polls appear to suggest, approval ratings may understate the extent to which younger generations support the Democratic candidate. Future work should examine how these ratings might be adjusted to better facilitate intergenerational comparisons. However, any adjustment would likely forgo the eighty-three year length of the approval rating time series or overall interpretability of the model. Whether the benefit of adjustment exceeds the cost will be clearer after the 2020 American presidential election, which is sure to test the assumptions of every forecasting method.
Figure 1: Comparing 18-year-olds (currently Generation Z, birth year 2002, magenta): Estimated Republican support from 18-year-olds since 1950 (top) and cumulative partisan impressions producing this support from birth to age 18 for select birth years (bottom).
Figure 2: **Comparing 35-year-olds (currently Millennials, birth year 1985, blue):** Estimated Republican support from 35-year-olds since 1950 (top) and cumulative partisan impressions producing this support from birth to age 35 for select birth years (bottom).
Figure 3: Comparing 52-year-olds (currently Generation X, birth year 1968, teal): Estimated Republican support from 52-year-olds since 1950 (top) and cumulative partisan impressions producing this support from birth to age 52 for select birth years (bottom).
Figure 4: **Comparing 68-year-olds (currently Baby Boomers, birth year 1952, green):** Estimated Republican support from 68-year-olds (Baby Boomers) since 1950 (top) and cumulative partisan impressions producing this support from birth to age 68 for select birth years (bottom).
Figure 5: Relative vote share: Estimated Republican support by age, race, ethnicity, and sex. These estimates can be post-stratified to predict the outcome of the 2020 election, which we plan on doing when data becomes available.
References


Hyman, Herbert. 1959. “Political Socialization.”
