## Interactions in multilevel models

#### Andrew Gelman, Samantha Cook, and Shouhao Zhou Department of Statistics and Department of Political Science Columbia University

9 Aug 2005

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Andrew Gelman, Samantha Cook, and Shouhao Zhao Interactions in multilevel models

## Multilevel models and interactions

- Interactions in before-after studies
- Interactions in regressions with many input variables
- Many questions, few answers (yet)
- Collaborators:
  - Jouni Kerman, Iain Pardoe, Boris Shor, David Park, Joe Bafumi, Gary King, Zaiying Huang, Valerie Chan, Matt Stevens

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## No-interaction model

Before-after data with treatment and control groups
 Default model: constant treatment effects



#### 'before" measurement, <u>x</u>

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 Fisher's classical null hyp: effect is zero for all cases
 Regression model: yes Did to Xid et al



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- Treatment interacts with "before" measurement
- Before-after correlation is higher for *controls* than for *treated* units
- Examples

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## Actual data show interactions

- Treatment interacts with "before" measurement
- Before-after correlation is higher for *controls* than for *treated* units
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An observational study of legislative redistricting An experiment with pre-test, post-test data Congressional elections with incumbents and open seats

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# Observational study of legislative redistricting: before-after data



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Educational experiment: correlation between pre-test and post-test data for controls and for treated units



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Correlation between two successive Congressional elections for incumbents running (controls) and open seats (treated)



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#### Interactions as variance components

- For control units,  $\eta_i$  persists from time 1 to time 2
- For treatment units,  $\eta_i$  changes:
  - Subtractive treatment error  $(\eta, only at time 1)$ Additive treatment error  $(\eta, only at time 2)$ 
    - Replacement treatment error
- Under all these models, the before-after correlation is higher for controls than treated units

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#### Interactions as variance components

#### Unit-level "error term" $\eta_i$

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For treatment units,  $\eta_i$  changes:

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# Summary of first part of talk

- Treatment interactions are important
- Before-after correlations are *lower* in treatment group
- Interpret as additional variance component that is altered by the treatment

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## Examples of interactions in regression

- Federal spending by state, year, category (50  $\times$  19  $\times$  10)
- ► Vote preference given state and demographic variables (50 × 2 × 2 × 4 × 4)
- Rich state, poor state, red state, blue state (50 × 2 for each election)
- Meta-analysis of incentives in sample surveys (2<sup>6</sup>)

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- Lots of potential interactions
- Setting high-level interactions to zero? Too extreme, especially when interactions are of substantive interest
- Simple hierarchical model for interactions is too crude
- Model: large main effects can have large interactions. In hierarchical setting, model should come "naturally"

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### General concerns

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Federal spending

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# Federal spending by state

- Federal spending by state, year, category  $(50 \times 19 \times 10)$
- $\blacktriangleright$  For each spending category, 50  $\times$  19 data structure
- $\blacktriangleright y_{jt} = \alpha_j + \beta_t + \gamma_{jt}$
- ▶ possible model:  $\gamma_{jt} \sim N(0, A + B|\alpha_j\beta_t|)$
- Some example data

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Incentives in sample surveys Summary

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#### Federal spending

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### Interactions $|\gamma_{jt}|$ plotted vs. main effects $|\alpha_j\beta_t|$





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- Logistic regression:  $Pr(y_i = 1) = logit^{-1}((X\beta)_i)$
- ► X includes demographic and geographic factors: sex, ethnicity, age, education, state
- Hierarchical model for 4 age levels, 4 education levels, 16 age × education, 50 states
- Also consider interactions such as ethnicity × state

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### Logistic regression for pre-election polls

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### Logistic regression with lots of predictors

	mean	sd	2.5%	25%	50%	75%	97.5% Rhat	n.eff
B.0	0.402	0.147	0.044	0.326	0.413	0.499	0.652 1.024	110
b.female	-0.094	0.102	-0.283	-0.162	-0.095	-0.034	0.107 1.001	1000
b.black	-1.701	0.305	-2.323	-1.910	-1.691	-1.486	-1.152 1.014	500
b.female.black	-0.143	0.393	-0.834	-0.383	-0.155	0.104	0.620 1.007	1000
B.age[1]	0.084	0.088	-0.053	0.012	0.075	0.140	0.277 1.062	45
B.age[2]	-0.072	0.087	-0.260	-0.121	-0.054	-0.006	0.052 1.017	190
B.age[3]	0.044	0.077	-0.105	-0.007	0.038	0.095	0.203 1.029	130
B.age[4]	-0.057	0.096	-0.265	-0.115	-0.052	0.001	0.133 1.076	32
B.edu[1]	-0.148	0.131	-0.436	-0.241	-0.137	-0.044	0.053 1.074	31
B.edu[2]	-0.022	0.082	-0.182	-0.069	-0.021	0.025	0.152 1.028	160
B.edu[3]	0.148	0.112	-0.032	0.065	0.142	0.228	0.370 1.049	45
B.edu[4]	0.023	0.090	-0.170	-0.030	0.015	0.074	0.224 1.061	37
B.age.edu[1,1]	-0.044	0.133	-0.363	-0.104	-0.019	0.025	0.170 1.018	1000
B.age.edu[1,2]	0.059	0.123	-0.153	-0.011	0.032	0.118	0.353 1.016	580
B.age.edu[1,3]	0.049	0.124	-0.146	-0.023	0.022	0.104	0.349 1.015	280
B.age.edu[1,4]	0.001	0.116	-0.237	-0.061	0.000	0.052	0.280 1.010	1000
B.age.edu[2,1]	0.066	0.152	-0.208	-0.008	0.032	0.124	0.449 1.022	140
B.age.edu[2,2]	-0.081	0.127	-0.407	-0.137	-0.055	0.001	0.094 1.057	120
B.age.edu[2,3]	-0.004	0.102	-0.226	-0.048	0.000	0.041	0.215 1.008	940
B.age.edu[2,4]	-0.042	0.108	-0.282	-0.100	-0.026	0.014	0.157 1.017	170
B.age.edu[3,1]	0.034	0.135	-0.215	-0.030	0.009	0.091	0.361 1.021	230
B.age.edu[3,2]	0.007	0.102	-0.213	-0.039	0.003	0.052	0.220 1.019	610
B.age.edu[3,3]	0.033	0.130	-0.215	-0.029	0.009	0.076	0.410 1.080	61
B.age.edu[3,4]	-0.009	0.109	-0.236	-0.064	-0.005	0.043	0.214 1.024	150
B.age.edu[4,1]	-0.141	0.190	-0.672	-0.224	-0.086	-0.003	0.100 1.036	270
Bage edu[4 2]	-0 014	0 119	-0 280	-0 059	-0 008	0 033	0 239 1 017	240

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### Bayesian Anova display



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### Prediction error as function of # of predictors



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- Richer voters favor the Republicans, but
- Richer states favor the Democrats
- Hierarchical logistic regression: predict your vote given your income and your state ("varying-intercept model")

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### Varying-intercept model



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### Varying-intercept, varying-slope model



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### Interactions!



Avg Income 2000 vs. Var Slope 2000

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### 3-way interactions!



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# Meta-analysis of effects of incentives on survey response rates

#### 6 factors

- Incentive or not
- Value of incentive
- Form (gift or cash)
- Timing (before or after)
- Mode (telephone or face-to-face)
- Burden (short or long survey)
- Models

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- Burden (short or long survey)
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Federal spending Vote preferences Income and voting Incentives in sample surveys Summary

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## Model without interactions

Estimated effects on response rate (in percentage points)

	Beta (s.e.)
Intercept	1.4(1.6)
Value of incentive	0.34 (0.17)
Prepayment	2.8 (1.8)
Gift	-6.9(1.5)
Burden	3.3 (1.3)

Will a low-value postpaid gift really reduce response rates by 7 percentage points??

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#### Models with interactions

	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
Constant	60.7 (2.2)	60.8 (2.5)	61.0 (2.5)	60.1 (2.5)
Incentive	5.4 (0.7)	3.7 (0.8)	2.8 (1.0)	6.1 (1.2)
Mode	15.2 (4.7)	16.1 (5.1)	16.0 (4.9)	18.0 (4.6)
Burden	-7.2 (4.3)	-8.9(5.0)	-8.7 (5.0)	-9.9(5.0)
Mode  imes Burden		-7.6 (9.8)	-7.8 (9.4)	-4.9(9.1)
Incentive $\times$ Value		0.14 (0.03)	0.33 (Ò.09)	0.26 (Ò.09)
Incentive $\times$ Timing		4.4 (1.3)	1.7 (1.7)	-0.2(2.1)
Incentive $\times$ Form		1.4 (1.3)	1.1(1.2)	-1.2(2.0)
Incentive $\times$ Mode		-2.3(1.6)	-2.0(1.7)	7.8 (2.9)
Incentive $\times$ Burden		4.8 (1.5)	5.4 (1.8)	-5.2(2.7)
Incentive $ imes$ Value $ imes$ Timing			0.40 (0.17)	0.58 (0.18)
Incentive $ imes$ Value $ imes$ Burden			-0.06 (0.06)	1.10 (0.24)
Incentive $\times$ Timing $\times$ Burden				11.1 (3.9)
Incentive $ imes$ Value $ imes$ Form				0.30 (0.20)
Incentive $ imes$ Value $ imes$ Mode				-1.20(0.24)
Incentive $\times$ Timing $\times$ Form				9.9 (2.7)
Incentive $\times$ Timing $\times$ Mode				-17.4(4.1)
Incentive $\times$ Form $\times$ Mode				-0.3(2.5)
Incentive $ imes$ Form $ imes$ Burden				5.9 (3.2)
Incentive $ imes$ Mode $ imes$ Burden				-5.8 (3.0)
Within-study sd, $\sigma$	4.2 (0.3)	3.6 (0.3)	3.6 (0.3)	2.8 (0.3)
Between-study sd, $ au$	18 (2)	19 (2)	18 (2)	18 (2)

Andrew Gelman, Samantha Cook, and Shouhao Zhao

Interactions in multilevel models

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- With many predictors come many many potential interactions
- Interactions can be crucial to substantive understanding
- Simple pooling of high-level interactions ("Anova" or even "Bayesian Anova") is too crude, does not respect the structure of the parameters
- Simple inclusion of additional batches of interactions can hurt predictive power
- Goal: models where large main effects are more likely to have large interactions
- ▶ possible model:  $\gamma_{it} \sim N(0, A + B|\alpha_i\beta_t|)$
- But we really don't know yet what will work!

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- For example, parameter matrices α<sub>jk</sub> don't look like exchangeable vectors
- Similar problems arise in shrinking higher-order terms in neural nets, wavelets, tree models, image models, ...
- Recall the "blessing of dimensionality": as the number of factors, and the number of levels per factor, increases, more information is available to estimate the hyperparameters of the big model
- In the background: advances in Bayesian computation including parameter expansion (Meng, Liu, Liu, Rubin, van Dyk), adaptive Metropolis algorithms (Pasarica), structured

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# Structured hierarchical models

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- Treatment interactions in before-after studies
- 2-way, 3-way, ...., interactions in regression models.
- Appropriate models have lots of structure
- We need to try out different classes of models and see what works

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