Sandeep Baliga presents an argument that is interesting but, I think, flawed. Baliga writes:
Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review has been revealed. The main changes:
(1) We promise not to use nuclear weapons on nations that are in conflict with the U.S. even if they use biological and chemical weapons against us;
(2) Nuclear response is on the table against countries that are nuclear, in violation of the N.P.T., or are trying to acquire nuclear weapons.
This is an attempt to use a carrot and stick strategy to incentivize countries not to pursue nuclear weapons. But is it any different from the old strategy of “ambiguity” where all options are left on the table and nothing is clarified? Elementary game theory suggests the answer is “No”.
Why, according to Baliga, does a nuclear policy have no effect? In short, because the government is not in fact constrained to follow any specified policy in the future:
Contracts we write for private exchange are enforced by the legal system. . . . But there is no world government to enforce the Nuclear Posture Review so it is Cheap Talk. . . .
What if our targets do not know our preferences? Do they learn anything about our preferences by the posture we have adopted? Perhaps they learn we are “nice guys”? But even bad guys have an incentive to pretend they are nice guys before they get you. Hitler hid his ambitions behind the facade of friendliness while he advanced his agenda.
I commented:
Is this really true? My impression was that Hitler was pretty aggressive, in his rhetoric as well as his actions.
One could argue that Hitler was so evidently a bad guy, even at the time, that he had nothing to gain by talking nice. But, the point remains, that if “cheap talk” is really so valueless as all that, there’d be no reason for anyone to do it at all. I think it might be more useful to model actors (such as “the U.S.” or “Germany”) as complex entities, and to consider that stated policies and goals might, at the very least, affect he balance of power in future intra-organizational struggles.
To which Baliga replied:
My point is not that cheap talk is useless in ALL games, only in some games. . . . But there is one key case where cheap talk is useless even in games of incomplete information: when a player i’s preferences over player j’s actions do not depend on player i’s preferences. In the nuclear story, this arises if the player i prefers that player j not acquire nuclear weapons, whether player i is itself rapacious, conciliatory or something in between. Then, player i will always send the message that minimizes the probability that player j arms and cheap talk cannot be informative.
This clarification helps, but I still think the analysis breaks down in this example.
One way to see this is to ask, if this “cheap talk” is useless, why it’s done at all! Or, conversely, why it wasn’t done earlier. Baliga’s analysis seems to me to rely on there being some “suckers” somewhere who don’t realize what’s going on.
Perhaps, for example, the leaders of Iran, Russia, etc., aren’t fooled by the cheap talk.–after all, they run countries and have incentives to understand the relevant signaling–but maybe it could sway American voters, who don’t have the time and inclination to gain a deep understanding of power politics. But . . . if it could fool the voters, it could change U.S. policy, and in that sense the stated policy does mean something. Beyond this, there are default effects and status quo effects and costs to violating or altering a stated policy. So I don’t think such public statements are necessarily meaningless, especially considering the many players involved in policymaking in any country.
On the other hand, I know next to nothing about international relations, so I could well be missing something important. I don’t see Baliga’s conclusions as following from basic game theory but maybe there’s something about this particular setting that changes things.
"Is this really true? My impression was that Hitler was pretty aggressive, in his rhetoric as well as his actions."
Hitler sought 'cordial relations' with UK
Of course, this is before he actually gained absolute control over Germany, so in some sense he was operating from a position of weakness. Or perhaps from a position of "I can't do anything at this time, so why not appear nice?".
An interesting side-note to this, years ago I heard an interview with someone who served on the joint chiefs under Reagan. (I wish I had more information to make this slightly less anecdotal)
He maintained that the official internal US policy was to not respond to a Soviet nuclear attack. The administration reasoned that humans might survive a one-sided nuclear attack, but not a full-on war. So a Soviet "victory" was preferable to extinction.
Meanwhile, both sides preached MAD and aggression, right?
I think this policy serves as a signal to Obama supporters and little more. And Baliga's point is well taken as North Korea was a signatory of the NPT and simply withdrew when it chose to publicly develop nuclear weapons. However, I understand your point about today's Cheap Talk becoming tomorrow's National Identity. It seems as if you are considering the long-term while Baliga is more short-term.
I also know next to nothing about international relations. You covered the possibility of playing to American voters. Maybe it can sway the public in some other countries, say in Europe, which can then affect those country's policies.
Mike, "This American Life" had a similiar story about Britian's position on what to do if nuclear war actually arises: Apparently in the event of a strike the nuclear sub commanders are supposed to open a locked safe to get a handwritten note from the PM. The official position is its just a legal necessity to give authorization, but it may very well be a 'call off the attack' order. MAD has been the quintessential game-theory example, but it demonstrates a problem with game-theory: what do you do once the assumption of rationality is broken? After the first missiles are launched, MAD has failed and the there's suddenly no benefit to going through with the counterattack: you're already defeated either way. The other side has to believe you're vindictive enough to go through with the counter-attack, but once the situation arises the logic of the game changes.
There's a good critique of game theory along similar lines, where you eliminate a branch of play because you assume your opponent will play rationally and that he thinks you'll play rationally, so he'll direct the game down a line that's bad for you. But if you actually did make that choice, you would have just demonstrated irrationality, so why would your opponent then assume you're completely rational?
You both seem to have left out a real impact: that these policies are internal planning documents. If we have a policy of using nuclear weapons – maybe – then we need policies and infrastructure / manpower that supports those possibilities. If we limit the use of nuclear weapons, that means the policies and infrastructure / manpower / planning, etc. requirements for nuclear use change. When the military budget is huge but strained, this should be reflected in a more sensible internal allocation toward policies that we may actually follow.
Just a small note on that:
"One could argue that Hitler was so evidently a bad guy, even at the time, that he had nothing to gain by talking nice."
As Wayne already mentioned, there was some sweet-talking in Hitler's rhetoric in the '30s. I have to add that he could and indeed did gain by talking nice: it wasn't about "not looking like a bad guy", but rather about "looking like the lesser evil next to Stalin". And it can be said that this worked, at least to the extent that Britain remained reluctant to consider Stalin as a potential ally against Hitler for quite a while.
I think Jonathan makes a good point. Let's put aside the obvious fact that the policy might change again in future administrations, and assume that the Obama administration, at least, intends to abide by it. If that's true, then it's not just a matter of talk, the policy has real-world implications, or at least it can. For instance, if the U.S. military were to plan a response to an Arab-Israel war, nukes would be off the table completely (if, as I believe is the case, the Arab states are signatories of the anti-proliferation treaty and are not known to be in violation). On the one hand, that might slightly increase the probability of such a war, but on the other hand it might decrease the probability of those states pursuing nuclear weapons. It's true that a _future_ administration might change the policy, of course, but if it's really true that this is the Obama Administration's policy, then it does have an effect.
Of course, one can suspect that this is not actually the Obama Administration's policy, that they're just saying it is. And that could be right. But that's very different from claiming that this really is the policy but that that's irrelevant because policies can change.
Also, I agree with Andrew's point (though I would put it differently) that if "talk is cheap" presidents etc. wouldn't bother talking. At the very least, the talk matters internally to our country and to others: Republicans immediately claimed Obama is either a fool or a traitor, presumably because they think that this stance on their part will help Republicans get elected this fall. And at least the policy also matters with respect to the internal politics of other countries: for example, Ahmedinejad immediately responded that the U.S. is rattling sabers, presumably because he believes this stance will help him maintain power at home…which might (or might not) indicate that he is trying to counteract internal pressure to slow down the Iranian nuclear program. But the effects of the policy can't really stop with those "at leasts", because the internal politics affect the relationship between countries.
In short, I think the Baliga's thesis isn't right.
Andrew,
I think you are right in your analysis. My personal take is that the NPR really serves two purposes:
– send a signal inside that essentially nixes side development R&D of "newer" concepts. More precisely it really is a way of defining what "new" means especially when considering the stockpile stewardship issues and its fiscal bearings.
– send a signal outside that a signatory of the NPT in good standing has a potentially better chance of developing communication channels with the U.S. in case of "misaligned" interests. Also, the NPR helps in providing momentum for other countries' legislatures to ratify a series of sensitive treaties where their national interests could be seen at stake.
Igor.
Right, official pronouncements of strategic doctrine tend to have impact on internal planning.