Politicians have a lot of leeway in how they vote

Matthew Yglesias remarks that, when staking out positions, congressmembers are not very strongly constrained by the ideologies of their constituents.

Wow, that was a lot of big words. What I meant to say was: Congressmembers and Senators can pretty much vote how they want on most issues, whatever their constituents happen to believe. Not always, of course, but a representative can take a much more liberal or conservative line than the voters in his or her district or state, and still do fine when election time comes.

Yglesias gives some examples from the U.S. Senate, and I just wanted to back him up by citing some research from the House of Representatives.

First, here’s a graph (based on research with Jonathan Katz) showing that, when running for reelection, it helps for a congressmember to be a moderate–but not by much:

median.png

Being a moderate is worth about 2% of the vote in a congressional election: it ain’t nuthin, but it certainly is not a paramount concern for most representatives.

To look at this another way, here’s a graph showing the members of the House of Representatives in 1993-1994:

fig9.6.png

Representatives from more politically extreme districts tended themselves to be further to the right (if Republicans) or to the left (if Democrats), but only slightly so, with a lot of exceptions. There’s a lot of leeway on where politicians stand.

(And, yes, many of these Democrats did lose in 1994–but, pretty much, the ones that lost were those in marginal districts, not particularly those with extremely liberal ideologies. By this I’m not trying to say the extreme liberals benefited from their ideology–as noted above, I estimate that it hurt them by, on average, a couple percentage points of the vote–but that these couple percentage points didn’t really matter much; the partisanship of their districts was much more of the key factor in determining whether they were reelected.)

More discussion here, in the context of the notorious “median voter theorem.” As I wrote earlier, I am sympathetic to the related point that it can be a mistake to assume that politicians of your political party agree with you, deep down, on the issues, and that they’re only voting differently because of expedience, craven political calculation, or whatever. It’s worth considering the hypothesis that lots of Democratic politicians do not share the values and policy preferences of lots of Democratic voters, and similarly for the Republicans. Given the diversity of public opinion, this really has to be true on some issues, and it very well might be true all over the place.

Another way of saying all this is: Incumbent congressmembers almost always win reelection. And, when they don’t, they’re often losing as part of a national swing (as in the 1994 Republican sweep or the 2006/2008 Democratic shift). And when an incumbent does lose unexpectedly, it can be for something unrelated to their votes (remember the “check kiting scandal” of 1992?).

P.S. The above graphs come from chapter 9 of Red State, Blue State, a book whose expanded, paperback edition is coming out at the end of the month. This edition features a new chapter on the 2009 election and is, I think it’s safe to say, the perfect Christmas gift for all the statistically-minded political junkies on your holiday shopping list. The New York Observer got it right when they wrote, “This is the Freakonomics-style analysis that every candidate and campaign consultant should read.”

4 thoughts on “Politicians have a lot of leeway in how they vote

  1. Michael: In theory this could be possible. But in most years almost all the members of the House run for reelection–those in marginal districts as well as those who get elected in landslides.

  2. I don't want to sound reflexively cynical, but what happens if you compare a politician's votes and their campaign donations? It might turn out that politicians are *not* free to vote against the interest groups who donate to them.

    The site maplight.org has data that could help with such an analysis.

  3. anon, John Lott claims to have tested that in Freedomnomics and found no evidence of campaign contributions influencing votes (or elections), based on the votes of retiring legislators who don't need to run for re-election. His take is that people give money to politicians for the same reason they vote for them: they want them to win, even if that doesn't result in any special treatment.

    Incumbency advantage should theoretically give politicians leeway over interest group donors just as it gives it to them over voters.

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